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Anahtar kelimeler: Ağ güvenliği, Ağ saldırıları, Akıllı güvenlik Duvarı ajan, Saldırı Tespit 
Sistemi, hizmet Saldırı, Iptablo. 
 
Günümüzde elektronik banka, elektronik ticaret ve elektronik vergi uygulamaları gibi çok 
sayıda işlem internet üzerinden gerçekleştirilmektedir. Bu işlemler çeşitli riskler 
içermekte, kişi ve kurumları çeşitli bilgi sızmalarıyla mesul bırakarak hedef haline 
getirebilmektedir. Günümüzdeki en yaygın saldırılar “DOS” ve “Spoofing” saldırılarıdır. 
Bu konuda çok sayıda açık kaynak uygulama olması, saldırganların bu uygulamalarla 
firmaların kaynaklarına kolayca erişebilmesini sağlamıştır. Çoğu firma klasik güvenlik 
sistemlerinin bir parçası olan saldırı tespit sistemleri ve güvenlik duvarı kullanmaktadır. 
Bu sistemlerin kullanılmasına rağmen, klasik sistemlerin işlevsel eksiklikleri vardır. 
Örneğin güvenlik duvarları zararlı paketlerle normal paketleri birbirinden ayıramazlar. 
Saldırı tespit sistemleri atakları tespit edebilir, fakat yanlış alarm da verebilmektedir. Bu 
durum, “DOS” ve “Spoofing” saldırılarına karşı daha etkili bir sistem geliştirme ihtiyacını 
ortaya çıkarmıştır. Çalışmada güvenlik duvarları ile saldırı tespit sistemlerini 























Keywords: Network security, network attacks, an intelligent firewall agent, intrusion 
detection system, denial of service attacks. 
 
A number of transactions like e-banking, e-commerce and e-taxations are carried out over 
the internet today. Some of these transactions pose security risks and have made various 
people and organizations become targets of attacks there by exposing them to lots of 
business liabilities such as data leakages and compliance. Today the most common forms 
of attacks are DOS and Spoofing attacks and this is mainly due to the availability of a 
number of open source software which can be used by attacker’s to easily gain 
unauthorized access to company resources and as a result numerous systems have been 
victims of DOS and spoofing attacks. Most organizations have been deploying traditional 
network security mechanisms such as firewalls and IDSs to secure their systems. Despite 
deploying these security measures, networks are still prone to attacks since traditional 
network security mechanisms have shortcomings for example firewall systems do not 
have the ability to differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate packets sent to a 
network. IDSs can detect attacks but give out a lot of false alarms. This has therefore 
necessitated the need to come up with a much more efficient defense mechanism against 
these DOS and Spoofing attacks. The study proposed an intelligent firewall agent, and the 
intelligent firewall agent integrated a firewall and IDS systems for prevention and 
detection of attacks respectively. Also an expert system was integrated in the IDS so that 
to record the time an attack happened in seconds by so doing false alerts can be reduced 










CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1. Background of the Study 
 
Internet is changing our way of communication, business mode, and even everyday life. 
Almost all the traditional services such as banking, power, medicine, education and 
defense are extended to Internet now. With this, the use of internet is growing at an 
exponential rate in the last decades and continues to develop in terms of dimension and 
complexity[1]. The United Nations released report whıch states that nearly 3 billion 
people had access to the Internet by the end of 2014 [2], [3] reports that globally 3.2 billion 
people are using the Internet by end 2015. With increased reliance on internet, complexity 
of network attacks has also increased significantly [4].  
 
Nevertheless, the network security threats increase with internet evolution. For instance a 
mere 171 vulnerabilities were reported in 1995 which increased to 7,236 in 2007, already 
the number for the same for merely the third quarter of 2008 has gone up to 6,058. Apart 
from these a large number of vulnerabilities go unreported every year [1]. In most of these 
cases it takes time to discover a real crime maker and until this moment some of these 
attacks are still registered as unknown for example state that big companies like Sony 
group and Google were penetrated by sophisticated attacks by some computer hackers 
who called themselves "Anonymous" in 2011[5]. Another cyber-attack occurred in 
Uganda between 2010-2012 in Kampala District where hackers without authority 
accessed Uganda Revenue Authority (URA) computerized systems, databases and 
released goods that had not paid customs taxes causing financial loss amounting to Ugx2 




Regionally cyber-attacks are estimated to have cost Asia pacific businesses $81bn in the 
past 12 months while firms in EU ($62bn) and North America ($61bn) are also counting 
the significant cost of attacks. Despite the clear risk only just over of half of firms surveyed 
said they currently have a cyber-security strategy in place [7].  
 
With loads of personal, commercial, military, and government information transferred 
over the internet, organizations are deploying traditional security mechanisms like 
Firewalling, IDSs and IPSs placed at the Internet edge to guard against any attacks. These 
mechanisms are also used to protect the network from external attacks. Such mechanisms 
are no longer enough to secure the next generation Internet [8]. Security vulnerabilities 
are discovered every year with just about every firewall on the market. What is worse is 
that most firewalls are often misconfigured, unmaintained, and unmonitored turning them 
into electronic doorstops (holding the gates wide open) [9]. Organizations require a 
systematic approach for securing their networks and to address that the study proposed an 
intelligent firewall agent so as to detect and prevent attack(s) on networks. By using 
Iptables firewall packets sent into a network can be filtered to ascertain whether they are 
coming from legitimate or illegitimate sources. 
 
1.2. Statement of the Problem 
 
The sharp increase in use of internet in different sectors or organizations for their day to 
day transactions has led to increased number of network attacks. Network attacks are from 
organizational to individual levels and this is due to the availability of tools and software 
programs which can be used by hackers to penetrate networks. Due to this a number of 
organizations have been victims of both spoofing and DOS attacks. These network attacks 
affect organizations by subjecting them to numerous risks, financial loses and penalties 
given by responsible authorities which have affected their efficiency, performance and 





Spoofing and DOS attacks occur while traditional security tools such as firewalls and IDSs 
are in place. The relative stagnation of the existing traditional security technologies 
according to [10] and the incapability of adequately protecting networks against attacks 
has led to increased attacks and [11] agree that existing traditional systems are problematic 
as follows; Every year there various cases of cyber-attacks caused by firewalls because 
they cannot differentiate between genuine incoming and outgoing traffic [9]. Traditional 
firewalls have degenerated in terms of ability to resist an attack against them and protect 
hosts behind them [12].  
 
In addition [13] explain that more challenges like the management of manually configured 
firewall rules are complex thus making firewalls error prone while [14] assert that 
traditional firewalls also rely on topology restrictions and controlled network entry points 
to enforce traffic filtering. In addition, [4] elaborate that firewall systems cannot 
differentiate between legitimate packets from attacker packets, also intrusion detection 
system has the packet differentiation ability though with a high false rate. 
 
To address the flaws and draw backs in the existing traditional firewall systems as stated 
above, the study employed an intelligent firewall agent to add intelligence to the 
traditional firewall systems. On the other hand the study aimed at coming up with a more 
effective mechanism against DOS and ARP spoofing network attacks by integrating an 
IDS with iptables firewall and an expert system to detect, prevent attacks and learn the 
detection time of an attack on a network respectively therefore serving as a counter 










1.3. Objectives of the Study 
 
The primary objective of the study was to design and implement an intelligent firewall 
agent as a defensive mechanism against denial of service and ARP spoofing attacks. 
 
1.3.1. Secondary objectives of the study 
 
a. The study was carried out to analyze denial of service attacks and ARP spoofing 
attacks. 
b. The study was carried out to detect and prevent DOS and ARP spoofing attacks 
on a network. 
c. The study was also carried out to add intelligence to the traditional firewall 
systems.  
 
1.4. Justification of the Study 
 
Recent incidents in cyberspace prove that network attacks can cause huge amounts of loss 
to governments, private enterprises, and the general public in terms of money, data 
confidentiality, and reputation. The research community has been paying attention to the 
network security problem for more than two decades [15] but no genuine and effective 
mechanism has been developed to defend organizations against network attacks. Most of 
the existing Intrusion detection systems implemented nowadays depend on rule-based 
expert systems where new attacks are not detectable [16]. An intelligent firewall agent if 
implemented would provide a better and efficient solution to increasing network attacks. 
 
Network attacks have become intriguingly overpowering and unfortunately most 
organizations do not have an open idea or a perfect and precise framework for countering 
these threats. Despite the fact that attacks trend are getting complex and the existing attack 
pattern recognition, learning and mitigation techniques prevailing in today’s traditional 




However, all these attacks occur while security tools such as firewalls and intrusion 
detection systems are in place. Firewalls in existing operational networks are often 
problematic [11], firewall systems cannot differentiate legitimate packets from attacker 
packets also IDS has the packet differentiation ability it has a higher false rate [4]. The 
potential damage to computer networks keeps increasing due to a growing reliance on the 
Internet and more extensive connectivity. Intrusion detection systems (IDSs) have become 
an essential component of computer security to detect network attacks that occur despite 
the best preventative measures being in place. A major challenge with current intrusion 
detection systems is that they give out numerous false positive and false negative alerts.  
 
1.5. Significance of the Study 
 
This study proposed implementation of an intelligent firewall agent as a defense 
mechanism against network attacks. The intelligent firewall agent proposed in this study 
successfully detected attacks on a network, used a preventative mechanism to prevent 
against DDOS and ARP spoofing network attacks using Iptables firewall to filter 
incoming and outgoing packets making use of the allow and deny rules approach. 
Furthermore, integrating an expert system during the detection stage and a decision 
making approach helped learn the detection time of an attack thus reducing on the false 
alerts, improved system performance and added intelligence to the system respectively.  
 
This study proposed a four way approach of Detection, Prevention, End of Attack and 
Cancel Attacks which ensures effectiveness than other measures which were earlier 
implemented but do not seem to embrace all the four approaches of network defense 
mechanism at once. Therefore the intelligent firewall agent approach is of paramount 
importance in the development of security mechanisms to prevent network attacks and 















2.1. Overview of the Open System Interconnected Model (OSI) 
 
In 1977 ISO established a subcommittee to develop an architecture for the definition, 
development, and validation of standards for distributed data processing systems, and to 
define the functionality needed for communication among application processes in 
heterogeneous computer systems [17]. In 1984 in order to aid network interconnection 
without necessarily requiring complete redesign, OSI reference model was approved as 
an international standard for communications architecture [18]. The OSI model is an 
abstract representation of the seven basic layers (as stated below and also shown in Figure 
1.1, in top to bottom order) involved to solve the communication problem: Application, 
Presentation, Session, Transport, Network, Data-link and Physical layers [19].  
 
Below are the functions of the different OSI layers; the application layer specifies how 
one particular application uses a network and contacts the application program running on 
a remote machine. The presentation layer deals with the translation and/or representation 
of data at the two end hosts of the communication. The OSI Session Layer Protocol 
provides session management, e.g. opening and closing of sessions. In case of a 
connection loss it tries to recover the connection. If a connection is not used for a longer 
period, the session layer may close it down and re-open it for next use. This happens 
transparently to the higher layers [19]. The Session layer provides synchronization points 
in the stream of exchanged packets. On the other hand, functions in the Session Layer are 
those necessary to bridge the gap between the services available from the Transport Layer 
and those offered to the Session users. The session Layer are concerned with dialogue 






Figure 2.1. OSI Model [21]. 
 
2.2. The TCP/IP Protocol suite 
 
The TCP/IP protocol suite is referred to as the Internet protocol suite and is the set of 
communications protocols that implements the protocol stack on which the Internet and 
most commercial networks run [22]. It is named after the two most important protocols in 
the suite: the TCP and IP protocols. The TCP/IP protocol suite like the OSI. [19], also 
states that the protocol suit, such as TCP/IP is the combination of different protocols at 
various layers. In addition, [19, 23] clarified that the TCP/IP is modelled in four (4) layers 
and this layered presentation leads to the term protocol stack, which refers to the stack of 
layers in the protocol suite. This layering is used for positioning (but not for functionally 
comparing) the TCP/IP protocol suite against others, such as Systems Network 
Architecture (SNA) and the Open System Interconnection (OSI) model.  
 
 




About TCP/IP layering, [19] states that layering makes each layer responsible for a 
different facet of communication. [24] also explains that the basic idea of layering is that 
each layer adds value to services provided by the set of lower layers in such a way that 
the highest layer is offered the set of services needed to run distributed applications. 
Layering thus divides the total problem into smaller pieces. 
 
 
Figure 2.3. Shows different responsiblity of each layer  [19]. 
 
2.2.1. Link layer 
 
The link layer sometimes called the data link layer or network interface layer, normally 
includes the device drivers in the operating system and the corresponding network 
interface card in the computer. Together they handle all the hardware details of the 
physically interfacing with the cable (or whatever kind of media is being used). The 
important role of link layer concerns address resolution that provides mapping between 
two different forms of addresses with ARP and RARP protocols (see figure 2.4 for proper 
functionality; it has complete information of network interface cards, i.e. driver details 




information of source address and destination address from software address to hardware 
address to send information on physical medium, because the kernel only recognizes the 
hardware address of network interface cards not the IP address or Physical address. 
Address resolution Protocols (ARP) translates an IP Address to a Hardware Address 
whereas Reverse Address Resolution Protocol (RARP) converts a hardware address to IP 
Address  [19].  
 
 
Figure 2.4. Resolution Protocols Working Scenarios  [19]. 
 
2.2.1.1. Address resolution protocol  
 
ARP provides a mapping between the two different forms of addresses [25]. In addition 
ARP as a protocol is used by the Internet Protocol (IP) [RFC826], specifically IPv4, to 
map IP network addresses to the hardware addresses used by a data link protocol. And the 
protocol operates below the network layer as a part of the interface between the OSI 
network and OSI link layer [26]. The Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) was developed 
to enable communications on an internetwork and Layer 3 devices need ARP to map IP 







ARP operates in a way that; before a device sends a datagram to another device, it looks 
in its ARP cache to see if there is a MAC address and corresponding IP address for the 
destination device. If there is no entry, the source device sends a broadcast message to 
every device on the network. Each device compares the IP address to its own. Only the 
device with the matching IP address replies to the sending device with a packet containing 
the MAC address for the device (except in the case of "proxy ARP"). The source device 
adds the destination device MAC address to its ARP table for future reference, creates a 
data-link header and trailer that encapsulates the packet, and proceeds to transfer the data. 
The figure below illustrates the ARP broadcast and response process [28]. 
 
Furthermore [29] argues that unlike most protocols, the data in ARP packets does not have 
a fixed-format header. Instead, to make ARP useful for a variety of network technologies, 
the length of fields that contain addresses depend on the type of network. However, to 
make it possible to interpret an arbitrary ARP message, the header includes fixed fields 
near the beginning that specify the lengths of the addresses found in succeeding fields. In 
fact the ARP message format is general enough to allow it to be used with arbitrary 
physical addresses and arbitrary protocol addresses.  The example in figure 2.5. Below 
shows the 28- octet ARP message format used on Ethernet hardware (where physical 








2.2.1.1. Redirect address resolution protocol 
 
RARP (defined in RFC903) is an early protocol for dynamic IP address assignment in 
Ethernet networks [29]. The TCP/IP protocol that allows a computer to obtain its IP 
address from a server is known as the Reverse Address Resolution Protocol (RARP) [30]. 
RARP often is used by diskless workstations because some network hosts, such as diskless 
workstations, do not know their own IP address when they are booted. To determine their 
own IP address, they use a mechanism similar to ARP, but now the hardware address of 
the host is the known parameter, and the IP address the queried parameter. RARP differs 
more fundamentally from ARP in a way that RARP server must exist on the network that 
maintains that a database of mappings from hardware address to protocol address must be 
pre-configured [27].  
 
Also when it comes to the format of an RARP packet, [19] argues that RARP is almost 
identical to an ARP packet (Figure 2.5) and the only  differences are that the frame type 
is 0x8035 for an RARP request or reply, and the op field has a value of 3 for an RARP 
request and 4 for an RARP reply. As with ARP, the RARP request is broadcast and the 
RARP reply is normally unicast. 
 
2.2.2. Network layer 
 
The network layer (sometimes called the internet layer) handles the movement of packets 
around the network. Routing of packets for example, takes place here. IP (Internet 
Protocol), ICMP (Internet Control Message Protocol) and IGMP (Internet Group 








2.2.2.1. Internet protocol 
 
The Internet Protocol (IP) is the standard network layer protocol of the Internet that 
provides an unreliable, connection-less, best-effort packet delivery service. The service is 
unreliable, because there are no guarantees that the IP datagram successfully gets to its 
destination [31]. The service is called unreliable because delivery is not guaranteed. The 
packet may be lost, duplicated, delayed, or delivered out of order, but the service will not 
detect such conditions, nor will it inform the sender or receiver. The service is called 
connectionless because each packet is treated independently from all others. A sequence 
of packets sent from one computer to another may travel over different paths, or some 
may be lost while others are delivered. Finally, the service is said to use best-effort 
delivery because the internet software makes an earnest attempt to deliver packets. That 
is, the internet does not discard packets capriciously; unreliability arises only when 
resources are exhausted or underlying networks fail [19, 29]. 
 
In figure 2.6 shows an IP format. The IP header format the most important bit is numbered 
0 at the left and the least significant bit of a 32 bit value is numbered 31 on the right. The 
4 bytes in the 32 bit value are transmitted in the order: bits 0-7, first, then bits 8-15, then 
16-23 and bits 24-31 last. The current protocol version is 4, so IP is sometimes called 
IPv4. The header length is the number 32 bits words in the header, including any options 
and since this is a 4 bit field it limits the header to 60 bytes.  The type of service field 
(TOS) is composed of a 3-bit precedence field (which is ignored today), 4 TOS bits, and 
unused bit that must be 0.The TOS bits are minimize delay, maximize throughput, 
maximize reliability, and minimize monetary cost. The total length field is the total length 
of the IP datagram in bytes  [19].  
 
Using total length field and the header length field, it becomes easy to know where the 
data portion of IP datagram starts and its length since this is a 16-bit field, the maximum 
size of an IP datagram is 65535 bytes. The identification field uniquely identifies each 




The time- to- live field, or TTL sets an upper limit on the number of routers through which 
a datagram can pass. TTL limits the life time of the datagram and it also initialized by the 
sender to some value (often 32 or 64) and decremented by one by every router that handles 
the datagram. When this field reaches 0, the datagram is thrown away, and the sender is 
notified with an ICMP message. The checksum is calculated over the IP header only. It 
doesn’t cover any data that follows the header. ICMP, IGMP, UDP and TCP all have 
checksum in their own headers to cover their header and data  [19]. 
 
 
Figure 2.6. IP Datagram  [19]. 
 
2.2.2.2. Internet control message protocol 
 
ICMP was originally defined by RFC 792, but has since been updated by several other 
RFCs and is currently described by RFC 4884 [32] and ICMP is often considered part of 
the IP layer  [19]. It is an invaluable tool when troubleshooting network problems and it 
communicates error messages and other conditions that require attention. ICMP messages 
are usually acted on by either the IP layer or the higher layer protocol (TCP or UDP). 
Some ICMP messages cause errors to be returned to user processes. ICMP messages are 







Figure 2.7 below shows the format of an ICMP message. Although each ICMP message 
has its own format, they all begin with the same three fields: an 8-bit integer message 
TYPE field that identifies the message, an 8-bit CODE field that provides further 
information about the message type, and a 16-bit CHECKSUM field (ICMP uses the 
same additive checksum algorithm as IP, but the ICMP checksum only covers the ICMP 
message). In addition, ICMP messages that report errors always include the header and 
first 64 data bits of the datagram causing the problem [29]. 
 
 
Figure 2.7. ICMP message   [19]. 
 
The ICMP TYPE field defines the meaning of the message as well as its format [29]. And 
there are 15 different values for the type field, which identify the particular ICMP message   





Figure 2.8. ICMP message types [33]. 
 
2.2.2.3. Internet group management protocol 
 
IGMPv2 allows group membership termination to be quickly reported to the routing 
protocol, which is important for high-bandwidth multicast groups and/or subnets with 
highly volatile group membership [34]. Like ICMP, IGMP is considered part of the IP 
layer. Also like ICMP, IGMP messages are transmitted in IP datagrams. IGMP has a fixed 
size message data. IGMP messages are specified in the IP datagram with a protocol value 





Figure 2.9. Encapsulation of an IGMP message within an IP datagram   [19]. 
 
2.2.3. Transport layer 
 
The transport layer provides a flow of data between two hosts, for the application layer 
above. In the TCP/IP protocol suite, there are two vastly different transport protocols: TCP 
(Transport Layer Protocol) and UDP (User Datagram Protocol). TCP provides a reliable 
flow of data between two hosts. Its concerned with things such as dividing the data passed 
to it from the application into appropriately sized chunks for the network layer below, 
acknowledging received packets, setting timeouts to make certain the other end 
acknowledges packets that are sent, and so on. Because this reliable flow of data is 




UDP is a transportation layer protocol, but it does not offer much more functionality other 
than IP. The checksum field in UDP header provides only a limited ability for error 
checking [35]. Figure 2.10 below shows a UDP header format. 
 
 




In the TCP/IP protocol suite, the User Datagram Protocol or UDP provides the primary 
mechanism that application programs use to send datagrams to other application 
programs. UDP provides protocol ports used to distinguish among multiple programs 
executing on a single machine. That is in addition to the data sent, each UDP message 
contains a destination port number and a source port number, making it possible for the 
UDP software at the destination to deliver the message to the correct recipient and for the 
recipient to send a reply [29]. 
 
UDP doesn’t use acknowledgements to make sure messages arrive, it doesn’t order 
incoming messages, and it doesn’t provide feedback to control the rate at which 
information flows between the machines. Thus messages can be lost, duplicated, or arrive 
out of order. Furthermore, packets can arrive faster than the recipient can process them.   
To summarize it all, the User Datagram Protocol (UDP) provides an unreliable 
connectionless delivery service using IP to transport messages between machines. Thus 
an application program that uses UDP accepts full responsibility for handling the problem 
of reliability, including message loss, duplication, delay, out-of-order delivery, and loss 
of connectivity [29]. 
 
2.2.3.2. Transmission control protocol 
 
To ensure reliable communications for applications and services that need them, TCP is 
available. It resides between IP and the application layer [31]. TCP provides a reliable, 
connection-oriented data stream delivery service [19] Connection oriented means the two 
applications using TCP (normally called the client and server) must establish a TCP 
connection with each other before they can exchange data. 
 
Without options, TCP header occupies 20 bytes as shown in the figure 2.11. The source 
and destination port number is used to identify the sending and receiving processes. The 
sequence number is essential in keeping the sending and receiving datagram in proper 




and FIN, each of them has a special use in the connection establishment, connection 
termination or other control purposes. Window size is advertised between communication 
peers to maintain the flow control [35]. 
 
 
Figure 2.11. The format of a TCP segment with a TCP header followed by data [29]. 
 
2.2.4. Application layer 
 
The Application Layer in TCP/IP groups the functions of OSI Application, Presentation 
Layer and Session Layer. Therefore any process above the transport layer is called an 
Application in the TCP/IP architecture. In TCP/IP socket and port are used to describe the 
path over which applications communicate. Most application level protocols are 
associated with one or more port number [20]. There are many common TCP/IP 
applications that almost all the implementations provides: Telnet for remote login, FTP, 
the File Transfer Protocol, and SMTP for electronic mail, SNMP and many other.  
 
2.2.4.1 Simple mail transfer protocol 
 
RFC 1425 defines the framework for adding extensions to SMTP [36]. The SMTP 
commands define the mail transfer or the mail system function requested by the users. The 
SMTP is used as the basis for most electronic mail (email). Email is the most popular 




globally. These messages take anywhere from a few seconds to a couple of hours to be 
delivered. An added attraction is the relatively low cost of sending large messages. 
Combined, these benefits give users a convincing argument for access to email, and thus 
the connection of their systems to the Internet. For a full and easy to read description of 
SMTP the reader is urged to consult. It must be noted that SMTP is a developing protocol, 
and as such, new threats could evolve [37].  
 
2.2.4.2. File transfer protocol 
  
The FTP, RFC 959 enables the transfer of character and binary files across a network. The 
design philosophy does not dictate a specific host, operating system or file structure it is 
completely independent. An FTP server uses two TCP ports to transfer a file [36]. Control 
Connection is established on Port 21, and Data Connection on Port 20. The FTP client is 
free to choose any available port. FTP has become the standard for publishing software, 
data, and documents on the Internet. However Adobe Acrobat and Hyper Text Transfer 
Protocol (HTTP) using the Hyper Text Markup Language (HTML) are becoming popular 
for documents. 
 
2.3. History of network security 
 
Recent interest in security was fueled by the crime committed by Kevin Mitnick. Kevin 
Mitnick committed the largest computer‐related crime in U.S. history. The losses were 
eighty million dollars ($8 million) in U.S. intellectual property and source code from a 
variety of companies. Since then, information security came into the spotlight. Public 
networks are being relied upon to deliver financial and personal information due to the 
evolution of information that is made available through the internet, information security 
is also required to evolve [38].  
 
Due to Kevin Mitnick’s offense, companies are emphasizing security for the intellectual 




protocols in the past were not developed to secure themselves. Within the TCP/IP 
communication stack, security protocols are not implemented. This leaves the internet 
open to attacks. Modern developments in the internet architecture have made 
communication more secure [38]. 
 
2.4. Network Security 
 
“Network Security refers to all hardware and software functions, characteristics, features, 
operational procedures, accountability, measures, access control, administrative and 
management policy required to provide an acceptable level of protection for Hardware 
and Software, and information in a network” [39].  
 
In addition, [40] explains that network security involves all activities that individuals, 
organizations, enterprises and institutions are undertaking to protect their value and on-
going employment of assets and the integrity and continuity of operations. Network 
security covers a variety of computer networks, both public and private, that are used in 
everyday jobs conducting transactions and communications among businesses, 
government agencies and individuals. Networks can be private, such as within a company, 
and others which might be open to public access. Network security is involved in 
organizations, enterprises, and other types of institutions. 
 
Network security consists of the provisions and policies adopted by a network 
administrator to prevent and monitor unauthorized access, misuse, modification, or denial 
of a computer network and network-accessible resources [41]. Network security is 
concerned with the concept of designing a secure network [42].  emphasize that network 
security is a main issue of computing because many types of attacks are increasing day by 
day [43]. As stated by [44], today, the Internet is an essential part of peoples‘ everyday 
life and many important and crucial services like banking, shopping, transport, health, and 




sources the number of hosts connected to the internet has increased to almost 400 million 
and there are currently more than 1 billion users of the Internet.  
 
Therefore, any disruption in the operation of the Internet can be very inconvenient for 
most of organizations’ and people. Since almost all the traditional services such as 
banking, power, medicine, education and defense are extended to Internet now. The 
impact of Internet on society can be seen from the figure 2.12 below which shows 
exponential increase in number of hosts interconnected through Internet. Internet usage is 
growing at an exponential rate as organizations, governments and citizens continue to 
increase their reliance on this technology [1]. For instance internet is growing rapidly in 
the last decades and continues to develop in terms of dimension and complexity. At the 
end of 2014, 42.3% of the world population was connected to the network [8] 
 
 
Figure 2.12. Internet Domain Survey Host Count [1]. 
 
Reports shows that the fastest growing cyber-threats involve attacks by nation states, 
competitors, and organized crime, though these remain much less common. According to 
White’s findings, attacks by nation states were up 86% in 2014, with activity focusing 
mainly on the oil and gas, aerospace and defense, technology, and telecommunications 
sectors. Reports of security incidents attributed to competitors increased 64% compared 




Malaysia, India, and Brazil. Further she states that cyber-criminals also appear to be 
switching their focus to medium-size firms as large companies bolster their data security.  
Larger companies (those with gross annual revenues in excess of $1billion) said they have 
detected 44% more incidents than last year, while medium-size companies reported a 64% 
increase [45].  
 
Recent incidents in cyberspace prove that network attacks have caused huge amounts of 
loss to governments, private enterprises, and the general public in terms of money, data 
confidentiality, and reputation. Security incidents cost businesses an average of $2.7 
million each year, according to a survey by Price Water Coopers.  The financial impact of 
breaches has also increased. The average reported loss from such incidents was up 34% 
in 2014 compared with the previous year. Furthermore, the number of organizations’ 
reporting losses greater than $20 million nearly doubled. As many incidents go undetected 
or unreported, the true scale of the problem is even greater [45]. Despite the clear risks 
and loses incurred by various organizations, only just over of half of firms surveyed said 
they currently have a cyber-security strategy in place [45].  Also techniques which are 
used by organizations today to prevent attacks on the network are not enough and 
inefficient to fully solve the problem. Traditional security mechanisms like Firewalling, 
Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems are deployed at the Internet edge are used to 
protect the network from external attacks. The available security tools are no longer 
enough to secure the next generation Internet [8]. Also that IDS have got a lot of false 
alarms also firewalls cannot differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate packets and 
there numerous security vulnerabilities discovered every year with just about firewall on 
the market. With all much importance attached to network security, a more systematic 
approach for securing the network is a must today [9]. 
  
Cyber-attacks are an increasingly significant danger for business. Not just cost in a 
financial sense but serious reputational damage can be inflicted if attacks undermine 
customer confidence. Despite this, nearly half of firms still lack a strategy to deal with the 




attacks can strike without warning and sometimes without the victim being immediately 
aware. The pressure from customers and clients cannot be ignored [7]. 
 
The number of potential security risks have increased at the same time that dependence 
on information technology has grown, making the need for a comprehensive security 
program even more important. Likewise, the job of those persons tasked with network 
security, often system administrators, has never been harder. The number of reported 
security incidents continues to grow and there is little indication that this trend will 
improve at any time in the near future [46]. In 2001, there were 52,658 reported incidents. 
By the end of the first quarter of 2002 there were already 26,829 incidents reported. A 
reported incident can be as simple as a single computer being compromised or as severe 
as a complete network compromise involving hundreds of client computers.  
 
Unfortunately, many companies have stopped short of implementing a more secure 
“layered” approach to network security and have chosen to rely solely on the firewall/virus 
scanner approach. While firewalls and virus protection are necessary, by themselves they 
address only one portion of potential security risks and may contribute to a false sense of 
security. Although, network security is a critical requirement in emerging networks, there 
is a significant lack of security methods that can be easily implemented to ensure security 
of a network [40].  
 
Till today when network security is mentioned, the general public is more often aware of 
security failures than of the technology available for secure communications. Viruses, 
worms, Trojan horses, denial-of-service attacks, and phishing are well known 
occurrences. Access controls, authentication, confidentiality, integrity, and non-
repudiation, which are measures to safeguard security, are neither well known nor 
appreciated. However, when these security mechanisms are in place, users can have a 





Therefore Network security has become a main issue of computing because many types 
of attacks are increasing day by day [43]. And this is because of the increased reliance on 
internet. In support for this [2] states that according to the United Nations released report 
nearly 3 billion people had access to the Internet by the end of 2014 furthermore, [3] 
reports that globally 3.2 billion people are using the Internet by end 2015.  
 
Network Security is not only concerned with the security in the computers at each end of 
the communication chain but also with the security of a network as a whole. When 
transferring from one node to another node data the communication channel should not 
be vulnerable to attack. A hacker will target the communication channel, get the data, and 
decrypt it and reinsert a duplicate message. Though securing the network is just as 
important as securing the computers and encrypting the message [43]. And when 




“This refers to the ability to control the level of access that individuals or entities have to 
a network or system and how much information they can receive” [49]. In addition [49] 
elaborates that access is the ability to limit and control the access to host systems and 
applications via communication links. For this, each entity trying to gain access must first 
be identified or authenticated, so that access rights can be tailored to the individuals. 
  
A common threat that concerns many sites is unauthorized access to computing facilities. 
Access to network resources should only be permitted to authorized users. This is called 
authorized access. This access can take many forms, such as use of another user’s account 
to gain access to the network and its resources.  In general, the use of any network resource 
without prior permission is considered to be unauthorized access.  Therefore the network 
security policy should identify who is authorized to grant access to your services and 
determining what type of access these individuals can grant is important in identifying the 




control who is granted access to your system, it is difficult to control who is using your 
network. If you can identify the persons who are charged with granting access to the 
network, you can trace what type of access or control has been granted [50].  
 
2.4.2. Confidentiality  
 
“Confidentiality is the assurance that information is not made available or disclosed to 
unauthorized individuals, entities, or processes“[47]. Furthermore [50] defines 
“Confidentiality as the act of keeping things hidden or secret. He further emphasizes that  
It is an important consideration for many types of sensitive data”. Also [29] argues that 
the system must prevent outsiders from making copies of data as it passes across a network 
or understanding the contents if copies are made. Also [41] states that the other aspect of 
confidentiality is the protection of traffic flow from analysis. For example, a credit card 
number has to be secured during online transaction. 
 
2.4.3. Authentication  
 
“Authentication can be defined as the process of proving a claimed identity to the 
satisfaction of some permission-granting authority” [50]. Authentication systems are a 
combination of hardware, software, and procedural mechanisms that enable a user to 
obtain access to computing resources. Authentication mechanisms range from smart cards 
to biometric devices such as fingerprint readers, voice print readers, and retina scan 
devices. Secure user authentication is obtained through the encrypted exchange of the 
user’s security credentials or challenges.  
 
Security credentials are used in this context to mean something that the authentication 
server knows about a particular user or device, for example, the knowledge of a valid user 
name, password, token, PIN, challenge, or in the case of an authentication device, the 
device’s ID [47]. And most systems, the user has to specify a password to their user 




the user is who they claim to be, in other words; the password acts as a mechanism that 
authenticates the user. However, passwords can be stolen and someone else can 
impersonate the user. Because adequate measures are not taken as often as they should be, 
stolen passwords are the cause of a large number of security breaches on the Internet. By 
using the one time password un authorized users cannot access resources [50]. 
  
The one-time password system is designed to counter these types of attack and force a 
user to use a different password each time he or she logs in. This is accomplished by 
providing the user with a password that is different for each login, whether the login 
attempt is successful or not.  As a result, it is not possible for the passwords to be re-used 
in a replay attack. In the S/Key system, the user generates a secret password to which a 
one-way function is applied. The secret password does not leave the user terminal, but 
what is sent is the hashed password [47]. 
 
2.4.4. Integrity  
 
Integrity involves the unauthorized modification of information [51]. This could mean 
modifying information while in transit or while being stored electronically or via some 
type of media. [47] argues that integrity assures that data is not accidentally or deliberately 
modified in transit by replacement, insertion, or deletion. And to protect the integrity of 
information, one must employ a validation technique. This technique can be in the form 
of checksum, an integrity check, or a digital signature [47]. The process of verifying that 
the information that was sent is complete and unchanged from the last time it was verified.  
Information integrity is important for military, government, and financial institutions. It 
may also be important that classified information be undisclosed, whether it is modified 
or not modified. Information that is maliciously modified can create misunderstandings, 






2.4.5. Availability  
 
“Availability is allowing legitimate users access to confidential information after they 
have been properly authenticated” [51] . When availability is compromised, the access is 
denied for legitimate users because of malicious activity such as denial of service (DOS) 
attacks. And Availability ensures that resources or services must be available at all time 
when needed [52]. 
 
2.4.6. Non‐repudiation  
 
“Non-repudiation refers to protection against an individual denying sending or receiving 
a message” [47]. The non-repudiation service may take one or two forms: 
 
a. Non-repudiation with proof of origin: The recipient of the data is provided with a 
proof of the origin of data. This proof will protect the recipient against any attempt 
by the sender to falsely deny sending the data or its original content. The sender 
cannot deny that he sent the message, nor can the sender deny its original content. 
b. Non-repudiation with proof of delivery: The sender of data is provided with proof 
of delivery of data. This proof will protect the sender against any subsequent 
attempt by the recipient to falsely deny receiving the data or its original content. 
 
Network security [43] starts with authorization, commonly with a username and a 
password. Network security consists of the provisions and policies adopted by a network 
administrator to prevent and monitor unauthorized access, modification in system, misuse, 
or denial of a computer network and network-accessible resources. Basically network 
security involves the authorization of access to data in a network, which is controlled by 
the network admin.  
 
Furthermore, [43] advise that when considering about network security, it is emphasized 




computers at each end of the communication chain. When transferring from one node to 
another node data the communication channel should not be vulnerable to attack. A hacker 
will target the communication channel, get the data, and decrypt it and reinsert a duplicate 
message. 
 
Though securing the network is just as important as securing the computers and encrypting 
the message. It is important to have a well-conceived and effective network security policy 
that can guard the investment and information resources of your company. A network 
security policy is worth implementing if the resources and information your organization 
has on its networks are worth protecting [43]. Since most organizations have sensitive 
information and competitive secrets on their networks, these should be protected against 
vandalism in the same manner as other valuable assets such as corporate property and 
office buildings [50].  
 
The Model of network Security Situation; they explain that the network environment is 
very complex, it consists of all kinds of computers, operating systems, services and 
programs, while it also can be simply concluded as a system to transfer data. By defining 
its single working pattern as transferring data, the network environment can be simplified 
as a world made up of many castles which are connected with highways, in the castle there 
are some houses filled with gold coins and some workers working in the house, their work 
is very easy, just send letters out to another place that connected by roads. If the workers 
make mistake then they may send out a gold coin, if they have weakness then they may 
invite in some intruders who are intended to steal the gold coins or be controlled by 
someone to send out the gold coins. And in this model Zhang considers the local networks 
as a castle, views the computers as houses and views the operating system and programs 
as the workers. The network security problems are abstracted as a mission to keep the gold 
safe in its house [53].  
 
Like the locks used to help keep tangible property secure, computers and data networks 




both important and difficult. It is important because information has significant value 
information can be bought and sold directly or used indirectly to create new products and 
services that yield high profits. Security in an internet is difficult because security involves 
understanding when and how participating users, computers, services, and networks can 
trust one another as well as understanding the technical details of network hardware and 
protocols. Thus he argues that security is required on every computer and every protocol; 
a single weakness can compromise the security of an entire network [29]. 
 
An effective network security plan can be developed with the understanding of security 
issues, potential attackers, need level of security, and factors that make a network 
vulnerable to attack. To lessen the vulnerability of the computer on the network there are 
many products available. These tools are encryption, authentication mechanisms. IDS, 
security management and firewalls. Businesses throughout the world are using a 
combination of some of these tools. ”Intranets” are both connected to the internet and 
reasonably protected from it. The internet architecture itself leads to vulnerabilities in the 
network. Understanding the security issues of the internet greatly assists in developing 
new security technologies and approaches for networks with internet access and internet 
security itself. The types of attacks through the internet need to also be studied to be able 
to detect and guard against them [54]. 
  
Knowing the network is very crucial when keeping the network secure since it is not 
possible to protect anything unless one clearly understands WHAT one wants to protect. 
So organizations of any size should have a set of documented resources, assets and 
systems. Each of these elements should have a relative value assigned in some manner as 
to their importance to the organization. Examples of hardware that should be considered 
are servers, workstations, storage systems, routers, switches, hubs, network and Telco 
links, and any other network elements such as printers, UPS systems and HVAC systems. 
Other important aspects of this task included documenting equipment location and any 




such as UPSs which themselves may be part of the network if they are managed. 
Environmental equipment such as HVAC units and air purifiers may also be present [55].  
 
In addition, [55] states that understanding different threats is  the next step after knowing 
the network and this can be very helpful in identifying the potential “threats”. And threats 
can come from both internal and external sources. They may be human based, automated 
or even no intentional natural phenomenon. The latter might more appropriately be 
categorized under system health threats as opposed to security threats, but one issue can 
lead to the other. One example is a power outage to a burglar alarm. The power outage 
could be intentional or through some natural event such as a lightning strike. In either case 
security is diminished. 
 
2.5. Network Attacks 
 
“A Network attack is usually defined as an intrusion on your network infrastructure that 
will first analyze your environment and collect information in order to exploit the existing 
open ports or vulnerabilities” [56]. This may include as well unauthorized access to your 
resources, in such cases where the purpose of attack is only to learn and get some 
information from your system but the system resources are not altered or disabled in any 
way. 
 
How serious a particular type of attack is depends on two things: how the attack is carried 
out, and what damage is done to the compromised system. An attacker being able to run 
code on his machine is probably the most serious kind of attack for a home user. For an 
e-commerce company, a DOS attack or information leakage may be of more immediate 
concern. Each vulnerability that can lead to compromise can be traced to a particular 
category or class of attack. The properties of each class gives a rough feeling for how 
serious an attack in that class is, as well as how hard it is to defend against. Attacks can 
lead to anything from leaving your systems without the ability to function, to giving a 




A useful means of classifying security attacks is in terms of Active and Passive attacks. 
[39, 52, 57]. “A passive attack attempts to monitor the information from the system but 
does not affect system resources”.  “An active attack attempts to harm system resources 
and their operations”.  
 
2.5.1. Passive attacks  
 
A passive attack monitors unencrypted traffic and looks for clear-text passwords and 
sensitive information that can be used in other types of attacks [39]. Though Passive 
attacks do not disrupt the normal operation of a network, it captures information about 
structure of a network and types of topology and the attacker snoops the data exchanged 
in a network without altering it. The requirement of confidentiality can be violated with 
passive attacks  if an attacker is also able to interpret the data gathered through snooping 
[58].  Passive attacks include traffic analysis, monitoring of unprotected communications, 
decrypting weakly encrypted traffic, and capturing authentication information such as 
passwords [39]. In addition passive interception of network operations enables adversaries 
to see upcoming actions. Passive attacks result in the disclosure of information or data 
files to an attacker without the consent or knowledge of the user [39] on addition, [59], 
stated that with a passive attack a system is monitored and sometimes scanned for 
open ports and vulnerabilities. The purpose is solely to gain information about the target 
and no data is changed on the target. 
 
2.5.1.1. Monitoring and eavesdropping  
 
This is the most common attack to privacy. By snooping to the data, the adversary could 
easily discover the communication contents. When the traffic conveys the control 
information about the sensor network configuration which contains potentially more 
detailed information than accessible through the location server, the eavesdropping can 
act effectively against the privacy protection [60]. Interception of communications by an 




only secretly listens to the networked messages. On the other hand, active eavesdropping 
is when the intruder listens and inserts something into the communication stream. This 
can lead to the messages being distorted. Sensitive information can be stolen this way 
[61]. 
 
2.5.1.2. Traffic analysis  
 
In this type of attack an attacker tries to sense the communication path between the sender 
and the receiver, this way the attacker finds the amount of data travelling between the 
route of the sender and the receiver and there is no alteration in data by the traffic analysis. 
Even when the messages transferred are encrypted, it still leaves a high possibility analysis 
of the communication patterns [62]. Sensor activities can potentially reveal enough 
information to enable an adversary to cause malicious harm to the sensor network [60]. 
 
2.5.2. Active attacks 
 
“An active attack attempts to alter or destroy the data being exchanged in the network 
thereby disrupting the normal functioning of the network” [58]. The principle of active 
attacks is that in an active attack a malevolent third party manipulates a response within a 
legitimate session in a way that tricks the client into issuing an unwanted request 
(unknown to the user) that discloses sensitive information. The attacker can then apply a 
regular passive attack on this information. It is important to emphasize that this is made 
possible by a design flaw not an implementation error or bug [63]. 
 
In an active attack, the attacker tries to bypass or break into secured systems [39]. This 
can be done through stealth, viruses, worms, or Trojan horses. Active attacks include 
attempts to circumvent or break protection features, to introduce malicious code, and to 
steal or modify information. These attacks are mounted against a network backbone, 
exploit information in transit, electronically penetrate an enclave, or attack an authorized 




disclosure or dissemination of data files, DoS, or modification of data. Furthermore, [64] 
states that there are four types of active attacks that are available that is; replay, 
masquerade and modification of messages and denial of service etc. 
 
In addition [52, 58] state that active attacks fall into two categories which is internal and 
external attacks. 
 
1. Internal Attacks; an insider attack involves someone from the inside such as a 
disgruntled employee attacking the network. Insider attacks can be malicious or 
non-malicious. Malicious insider attacks intentionally eavesdrop, steal, or damage 
information; use information in a fraudulent manner; or deny access to other 
authorized users. No malicious attacks typically result from carelessness, lack of 
knowledge, or intentional circumvention of security for such reasons as 
performing a task [65]. Internal attacks act as valid nodes and perform malicious 
tasks. Internal attacks can access the communication link and advertise false 
routing and  are very hard to detect as they appear like a normal node [52]. 
 
2. External Attacks; External attacks are not part of a network but are from some 
other entity or network. External attacks are often mere steppingstones leading to 
internal attacks when an outside attacker gains total control of a network node. 
 
2.5.2.1. Denial-of-service attacks 
 
“A denial of service (DOS) attack as an unambiguous effort by a horrible user to get 
through the capital of a server or a network thereby preventing rightful users from 
receiving services provided by the system” [66]. The sole purpose of DoS attacks is to 
disrupt the services offered by the victim. While the attack is in place and no action has 
been taken to fix the problem, the victim cannot be able to provide its services on the 
Internet. DoS attacks are really a form of vandalism against Internet services and take 




In a practical networking environment DOS can be defined in different ways depending 
on the target (that is specific application or service) [68]: 
 
a. Attacks against application servers: for example web servers, causing servers to 
be unavailable for public use. 
 
b. Flooding network gateways and firewalls: for example flooding with thousands or 
millions of Transmission Control Protocol / Internet Protocol Suite (TCP/IP) 
packets causing either slowness in network activities or the network to become 
completely unusable till all packets are dropped from the network. 
 
c. Attacking mail gateways: for example sending mail ware Simple Mail Transfer 
Protocol (SMTP) packets that can block email systems for a long period of time 
before they can be cleared. 
 
On the other hand [69] emphasizes that a DoS attack takes place when availability to a 
resource is intentionally blocked or degraded by an attacker. Since DOS attacks aim at 
exhausting a resource in the target system which completely reduces or subverts the 
availability of the service provided [70]. In other words the DOS attack impedes the 
availability of the resource to its regular authorized users. The attack may concentrate on 
degrading processes, degrading storage capability, destroying files to render the resource 
unusable, or shutting down parts of the system or processes [69]. This can lead to the 
server being unable to service all the requests thereby denying offering service to 
legitimate requests [71]. 
 
“Normal” DoS attacks are being generated by a single host (or small number of hosts at 
the same location). The only real way for DoS attacks to impose a real threat is to exploit 
some software or design flaw. Such flaws can include, for example, wrong 
implementations of the IP stack which can crash the whole host when receiving a non-




lower volumes of data unless some exploits exist at the victim hosts which have not been 
fixed a DoS attack should not pose a real threat to high-end services on today’s Internet 
[67]. 
 
On the other hand [58] argue that there exists many more ways to launch a DoS attack in 
a network which would not be possible in wired networks, DoS attacks can be launched 
against any layer in the network protocol stack. On the physical and MAC layers an 
adversary could employ jamming signals which disrupt the on-going transmissions on the 
wireless channel. On the network layer, an adversary could take part in the routing process 
and exploit the routing protocol to disrupt the normal functioning of the network for 
example an adversary node could participate in a session but simply drop a certain number 
of packets which may lead to degradation in the quality of service being offered by the 
network. On the higher layers an adversary could bring down critical services such as the 
key management service.  
 
The key objective of a DDoS attack is to compile multiple systems across the Internet 
with infected zombies/agents and form botnets of networks. Such zombies are designed 
to attack a particular target or network with different types of packets. The infected 
systems are remotely controlled either by an attacker or by self-installed Trojans (e.g. 
roj/Flood-IM) that are programmed to launch packet floods [72]. Although not a requisite, 
DDoS attacks are usually aimed to exhaust network resources, which makes DDoS attacks 
often bandwidth consumption attacks. DDoS attacks are now performed by people with 
fine-tuned objectives in mind. The motives are numerous such as terrorism and the 
possible damages can be severe [73]. 
 
The concept of these attacks is straightforward: By flooding a given device whether it is 
an IDS, a Web server, or some other resource with enough traffic, an attacker can exceed 
its ability to process inbound requests in a timely fashion which causes the device to slow 
dramatically or in some cases become completely unavailable. Flooding DoS attacks are 




conducted. The attacks seek to saturate a given system with hundreds, thousands, millions, 
or billions of connections, depending on the environment’s bandwidth or with an 
abnormally large amount of data flowing across a normal number of connections 
depending on the capacity of the attacked host, a flood DoS attack can be conducted by a 
single person using a single attacking system for example an attacker with a powerful 
server connected to an OC-3 line can easily take out a home-based system with more 
moderate hardware connected to the Internet via a DSL or a cable modem [74]. 
 
DDoS attacks do not rely on particular network protocol or system weakness. It simply 
exploits the huge resource asymmetry between the Internet and the victim. Since Internet 
architecture is open in nature, any machine attached to it is publically visible to another 
machines attached to enable the communication. The hacker or attacker community takes 
the unhealthy advantage of this open nature to discover any insecure machine connected 
to the Internet. The discovered machine is therefore infected with the attack code and the 
infected machine can further be used to discover and infect another machine connected 
and so on. The attacker thus gradually prepares an attack network called botnet. 
Depending upon the attacking code the compromised machines are called 
Masters/Handlers or zombies. Hackers send control instructions to masters which in turn 
control zombies [75]. The zombies under the control of masters/handlers transmit attack 
packets as shown in figure 2.13, which converge at victim to exhaust its resources [43]. 
 
 




Types of Denial of Service attacks: 
 
To be able to understand DDoS attacks it is necessary to have a formal classification. DOS 
are classified in terms of the degree of automation, exploited vulnerability, attack rate 
dynamics and their impact [76].  
 
a. SYN Flood Attack 
 
The SYN flood is the most common type of flooding attack. It occurs when incoming 
connections repeatedly refuse to execute the third part of the TCP three-way handshake 
[77]. When a system (called the client) attempts to establish a TCP connection to a system 
providing a service (the server), the client and server exchange a sequence of messages. 
This connection technique applies to all TCP connections including telnet, Web, email, 
etc. 
  
The process of how SYN flood attack occurs; the client system begins by sending a SYN 
message to the server, asking the server to open a connection. The server then 
acknowledges the SYN message by sending a SYN-ACK message to the client meaning 
it accepts to open the connection from the client (the ACK part) and asking if the client 
agrees to open the connection in the opposite sense (the SYN part). The client then finishes 
establishing the connection by responding with an ACK message to server. The 
connection between the client and the server is then open and the service-specific data can 
be exchanged between the client and the server. Figure 2.14 presents a view of this 
message flow [67]. Later system may exhaust memory, crash or be rendered otherwise 
inoperative. A relatively small flood of bogus packets will tie up memory, CPU, and 






Figure 2.14. TCP three-way handshake [67]. 
 
b. UDP Flooding Attack 
 
The UDP flood attack can be initiated by sending a large number of UDP packets to 
random ports on a remote host and this leads to depletion of available bandwidth for 
legitimate service requests to the victim system[70]. For a large number of UDP packets 
the victimized system will be forced into sending many ICMP packets eventually leading 
it to be unreachable by other clients. The attacker may also spoof the IP address of the 
UDP packets [78]. In addition a service on the host can crash by overwhelming it with 
information. The service cannot cope with all the available information and becomes 
unavailable for legitimate users [79]. This can sometimes cause systems connected to a 
network near a victim system to experience problems with their connectivity [80]. 
 
c. ICMP Flood 
 
ICMP flood is a relatively simple attack where an attacker sends large number of ICMP 
Echo Request messages to the targeted machine. The aim of this attack is to overflow 
victim’s buffer or to take up the full bandwidth of a victim, so that no legitimate 
communication can be performed to and from the victim’s machine. Currently ping floods 
are not considered to be a very significant threat since many countermeasures have been 




attacks include bandwidth limitation for ICMP connections, blocking ICMP messages at 
the edge router or turning off ICMP completely [81].  
 
d. Ping of Death 
 
The TCP/IP specification (the basis for many protocols used on the Internet) allows for a 
maximum packet size of up to 65536 octets (1 byte = 8 bits of data) containing a minimum 
of 20 bytes of IP header information and 0 or more bytes of optional information with the 
rest of the packet being data. It is known that some systems will react in an unpredictable 
fashion when receiving oversized IP packets. Reports indicate a range of reactions 
including crashing, freezing, and rebooting [67]. 
 
What makes the “Ping O’ Death” attack possible is the ability to send an echo request 
datagram with more than 65 507 octets of data and because of the way IP fragmentation 
is performed. IP fragmentation relies on an offset value in each fragment to determine the 
order in which the individual fragments should be reassembled. Therefore on the last 
fragment, it is possible to combine a valid offset with a suitable fragment size such that 
(offset+ size) > 65535. Since operating systems typically do not process the datagram until 
they have reassembled all the fragments, there exists the possibility of overflowing 





CHARGEN is a simple service provided by most TCP/IP implementation under UNIX. It 
runs on both UDP and TCP port 19. For every incoming UDP packet the server just sends 
back a packet with 0 to 512 randomly selected characters. Another well-known service is 
ECHO which is running on UDP and TCP port 7.  For each packet coming in the server 
just responses with whatever it has received. These two services are generally used for 




type attack. Assuming a “chain” has been established between a CHARGEN service and 
an ECHO service, what will happen? Each of them will produce output continuously, 
leading to a very large number of packets among the network and thus a denial of service 
on the machines where the services are offered [35].  
 
f. Smurf Attack 
 
Smurf attack is a type of ICMP flood attack; this type of attack floods the target machine 
with the spoofed broadcast ping messages. An attacker sends a large quantity of the ICMP 
echo request packets to many different network broadcast addresses; all packets have a 
spoofed IP address of the target victim. Routers will forward the ICMP packet to all hosts, 
the hosts will try to reply to the ICMP request by sending a reply message to the victim. 
If there are many hosts in used networks, a victim will be effectively spoofed by a large 
amount of traffic [82]. This technique causes every computer to respond to the bogus ping 
packets and reply to the targeted computer which floods it. This technique is called a 
Smurf attack because the DoS tool that is used to perform the attack is called Smurf [83]. 
 
g. Teardrop Attack 
 
The Teardrop is an old attack that relies on poor TCP/IP implementation that is still 
around. When the stack tries to reassemble packets, it cannot do it, and if it does not know 
how to toss these trash packet fragments out, it can quickly fail. Most systems know how 
to deal with Teardrops now and a firewall can block Teardrop packets in return for a bit 
more latency on network connections since this makes it disregard all broken packets. Of 
course if you throw a ton of Teardrop busted packets at a system, it can still crash. Many 
other variants such as Targa, SynDrop, Boink, Nestea Bonk, TearDrop2 and New Tear 







h. Land Attack 
 
A land attack consists of a stream of TCP SYN packets that have the source IP address 
and TCP port number set to the same value as the destination address and port number 
(i.e., that of the attacked host). Some implementations of TCP/IP cannot handle this 
theoretically impossible condition causing the operating system to go into a loop as it tries 
to resolve repeated connections to itself. Service providers can block LAND attacks that 
originate behind aggregation points by installing filters on the ingress ports of their edge 
routers to check the source IP addresses of all incoming packets. If the address is within 
the range of advertised prefixes, the packet is forwarded, otherwise it is dropped [67]. 
 
2.5.2.2. Access attacks 
 
Access attacks exploit known vulnerabilities in authentication services, FTP services, and 
web services to gain entry to web accounts, confidential databases and other sensitive 
information. Access attacks can consist of the following; Password attacks, Trust 
exploitation, Port redirection, Man-in-the-middle attacks, Social engineering, Phishing. 
 
a. Man-in-the-Middle Attack 
 
“A MITM attack is defined as an attack in which the intruder is able to read and write 
messages communicated between two parties of network without either party being 
conscious of this fact” [84]. With this type of attack there is an ability of the intruder to 
put himself between two communicating parties, a user (MS) and the network, enabling 
him for various actions including eavesdropping, modifying, deleting, reordering, 
replaying, and spoof signaling or user data. It becomes difficult for a user to understand 
whether they are connected to original secured connection or not. Since the certificate that 
is being passed during the connection setup is insecure, an attacker can easily modify the 




Furthermore [63] gives reasons why MITM attack is referred to as "active" rather than 
"passive", it is because of two essential differences in the nature of the attack: 
  
 It is initiated by the attacker rather than the victim  
 The target is entirely controlled by the attacker, rather than being limited by the 
extent of the victim's browsing activity. 
 
 
Figure 2.15. MITM Attack [85]. 
 
b. Password-Based Attacks 
 
A common denominator of most operating system and network security plans is password-
based access control. This means access rights to a computer and network resources are 
determined by who you are, that is user name and password. Older applications do not 
always protect identity information as it is passed through the network for validation. This 
might allow an eavesdropper to gain access to the network by posing as a valid user.  
When an attacker finds a valid user account, the attacker has the same rights as the real 
user and therefore if the user has administrator-level rights, the attacker also can create 
accounts for subsequent access at a later time. After gaining access to a network with a 
valid account, an attacker can do any of the following: [86].  
 
 Obtain lists of valid user and computer names and network information. 
 Modify server and network configurations, including access controls and routing 
tables. 





c. Port redirection attacks 
 
Once attackers have compromised a key target system such as firewall, they can use port 
redirection to forward al packets to a specified destination. The impact of this type of 
compromise is important to appreciate because it enables attackers to access to access any 
and all systems behind the firewall (or other target). Redirection works by listening on 
certain ports and forwarding the packets to a specified secondary target [9]. 
 
d. Trust exploitation attacks 
 
Although it is more of a technique than a hack itself, trust exploitation as shown in figure 
2.16 refers to an attack in which an individual takes advantage of a trust relationship within 
a network. The classic example is a perimeter network connection from a corporation. 
These network segments often house DNS, SMTP and HTTP servers. Because all these 
servers reside on the same segment, the compromise of one system can lead to the 
compromise of other systems because these systems usually trust other systems attached 
to the same network [9]. 
 
 
Figure 2.16. Trust Exploitation. 
 
2.5.2.3. Reconnaissance attacks 
 
Reconnaissance attacks can consist of the following: Packet sniffers, Port scans, Ping 




target network to determine which IP addresses are alive. Later the intruder uses a port 
scanner to determine what network services or ports are active on the live IP addresses. 
From this information the intruder queries the ports to determine the application type and 
version, and the type and version of operating system running on the target host.  
 
Based on this information, the intruder can determine whether a possible vulnerability 
exists that can be exploited. Using for example the Nslookup and Whois software utilities 
an attacker can easily determine the IP address space assigned to a given corporation or 
entity. The ping command tells the attacker what IP addresses are alive. 
 
1. Port scanning 
 
Port scanning provides list of open ports, closed ports and filtered ports. Through port 
scanning, attackers can find open ports and attack on services running on these ports. 
Network related details such as IP address, MAC address, router, gateway filtering, 
firewall rules, etc. can be known through this attack. Various port scanning techniques are 
TCP scanning, UDP scanning, SYN scanning, FIN scanning, ACK scanning, Window 
scanning etc. In Cloud scenario, attacker can attack offered services through port scanning 
(by discovering open ports upon which these services are provided) [87]. 
 
2. Packet Sniffers 
 
A packet sniffer is a piece of hardware or software that monitors all network traffic [88]. 
Packet sniffers are used for collecting the data (request and response) which transverse 
the network among various network devices as well as end user [89]. It involves capturing 
packets from the network transmitted by other computers and reading the data content in 
search of sensitive information like passwords, session tokens and confidential 
information. This could be done using tools called network sniffers; these tools collect 
packets on the network and, depending on the quality of the tool, analyze the collected 




sniffers is their ability to capture all incoming and outgoing traffic including clear-text 
passwords and usernames or other sensitive material [91] and at the end it is these that the 
attacker can use to attack a system. 
 
There are three types of sniffing methods. Some methods work in non-switched networks 
while others work in switched networks. The sniffing methods are: IP-based sniffing, 
MAC-based sniffing, and ARP-based sniffing [88, 92]. 
a. Identity spoofing (IP Address Spoofing) attacks 
 
This is the original way of packet sniffing. It works by putting the network card into 
promiscuous mode and sniffing all packets matching the IP address filter. Normally the 
IP address filter isn’t set so it can capture all the packets. This method only works in non-
switched networks [92]. When network card is set into promiscuous mode then host will 
be able to sniff all packets. A key point in the IP based sniffing is that it uses an IP based 
filter, and the packets matching the IP address filter is captured only [88]. 
 
b. MAC based sniffing 
 
This is as like IP based sniffing. Same concept of IP based sniffing is also used here 
besides using an IP based filter. Here also a requirement of setting network card into 
promiscuous mode exists. Here in place of IP address filter a MAC address filter is used 
and sniffing all packets matching the MAC addresses [88]. 
 
c. ARP based sniffing 
 
This method works a little different in that it does not put the network card into 
promiscuous mode [88]. Putting the network card in promiscuous mode is not necessary 
because ARP packets will be sent to the users. ARP based sniffing happens because the 
ARP protocol is stateless and therefore sniffing can be done on a switched network. To 




to be poisoned first, having a user identified as the other host in the connection. Once the 
ARP caches are poisoned, the two hosts start their connection, but instead of sending the 
traffic directly to the other host it gets sent to us. We then log the traffic and forward it to 
the real intended host on the other side of the connection. This is called a man-in-the-
middle attack [92]. 
 
3. Ping Sweep 
 
A ping sweep (also known as an ICMP sweep) is a basic network scanning technique used 
to determine which of a range of IP addresses map to live hosts (computers). Whereas a 
single ping will tell you whether one specified host computer exists on the network, a ping 
sweep consists of ICMP ECHO requests sent to multiple hosts. If a given address is live, 
it will return an ICMP ECHO reply.  Ping sweeps are among the older and slower methods 
used to scan a network. There are a number of tools that can be used to do a ping sweep, 
such as fping, gping, and nmap for UNIX systems, and the Pinger software from Rhino9 
and Ping Sweep from Solar Winds for Windows systems. Both Pinger and Ping Sweep 
send multiple packets at the same time and allow the user to resolve host names and save 
output to a file [93]. 
 
2.6. Intrusion Detection Systems 
 
“An IDS is a security system that monitors computer systems and network traffics and 
analyzes that traffic for possible hostile attacks originating from outside the organization 
and also for attacks originating from inside the organization” [16]. IDS are designed to 
detect any intrusion or hostile traffic in a network [94]. That is IDS are used to find out if 
someone has gotten into or is trying to get into your network and the most popular IDS is 
Snort [95] and IDSs can be software or hardware devices used to detect an attacks. 
 
The main function of Intrusion prevention system is to identify malicious activity, log 




inspect packets, looking for evidence of intrusive behaviors. As soon as an event is 
detected, an alarm is raised giving the security analyst an opportunity to react promptly 
and important to note, the main purpose of IDS is not to prevent attacks but to alert 
network administrator about the possible attacks so that they can be detected in time and 
hence their effect can be reduced.  [96]. IDS products are used to monitor connection in 
determining whether attacks were being launched. Some IDS systems just monitor and 
alert of an attack, whereas others try to block the attack [39]. On the other hand, [42] 
argues that an IDS is also known as IPS. IPSs are considered the extension of IDSs because 
they both monitor traffic and network activities for malicious activities. The main 
Difference between IPS and IDS unlike IDSs, IPSs are placed at Network gateway level 
to prevent/block intrusions that are detected. 
 
2.6.1. Approaches to intrusion detection system 
 
There are two general approaches to ID namely [16, 97]; Misuse detection and anomaly 
detection. Misuse detection operate with prior prepared patterns, also called signatures, of 
known attacks that are used to detect intrusions by pattern matching on audit information. 
Anomaly detection deal with profiling user behavior. In other words, they define a certain 
model of a normal user activity. Any deviation from this model is regarded as anomalous.  
 
2.6.2. Anomaly based approach 
 
Anomaly detectors identify abnormal unusual behavior on a host or network [98]. They 
function on the assumption that attacks are different from legitimate activity and can 
therefore be detected by systems that identify these differences. Using statistical method 
for anomaly detection is one of the oldest techniques applied in IDS research. In this 
approach, the normal user behavior is first defined based on what is acceptable within the 





Anomaly (or behavioral) detection is concerned with identifying events that appear to be 
anomalous with respect to normal system behavior [99]. A wide variety of techniques 
including data mining, statistical modeling and hidden Markov models have been explored 
as different ways to approach the anomaly detection problem. Anomaly based approach 
involves the collection of data relating to the behavior of legitimate users over a period of 
time and then apply statistical tests to the observed behavior, which determines whether 
that behavior is legitimate or not. Anomaly Based Detection has the advantage of detecting 
attacks which have not been found previously. The key element for using this approach 
efficiently is to generate rules in such a way that it can lower the false alarm rate for 
unknown as well as known attacks [97].  
 
2.6.1.2. Signature based ıntrusion detection 
 
Misuse (signature) based approach, is “detect what I know”, when an attack has been 
discovered, the different steps of the attack are encoded in a signature, then the signature 
is stored in a database and finally it is used by the system to detect attacks [97]. Misuse 
detectors analyze system activity, looking for events or sets of events that match a 
predefined pattern of events that describe a known attack. Misuse detection technique is 
the most widespread approach used in the commercial world of IDSs. The basic idea is to 
use the knowledge of known attack patterns and apply this knowledge to identify attacks 
in various sources of data being monitored. Therefore, misuse detection based IDSs 
attempt to detect only known attacks based on predefined attack characteristics [98]. 
 
As a result [99] signature based systems are capable of attaining high levels of accuracy 
and minimal number of false positives in identifying intrusions. Little variation in known 
attacks may also affect the analysis if a detection system is not properly configured. 
Therefore signature based detection fails to detect unknown attacks or variation of known 
attacks and one of the motivating reasons to use signature based detection is ease in 
maintaining and updating preconfigured rules. These signatures are composed by several 




header (e.g. source address, destination address, ports) and its options (e.g. payload, 
metadata), which are used to determine whether or not the network traffic corresponds to 
a known signature.  
 
2.6.2. Classification of ıntrusion detection systems 
 
It is classified into two basic type [16, 42]:- NIPS an HIDS. 
 
2.6.2.1. Network based ıntrusion detection systems 
 
“NIDS are intrusion detection systems that capture data packets traveling on the network 
media (cables, wireless) and match them to a database of signatures” [95]. NIPS monitors 
the entire network for suspicious activities like DoS attacks [99], port scans or even 
attempts to crack to into computers by analyzing protocol traffic like HTTP,TCP etc [42].  
NIDS dedicate a specific network device to act as a network activity monitor and sensor, 
and when a malicious activity is detected it alerts the network and blocks the intruders 
from doing further damage to the network participating hosts. 
 
The information collected from network is compared with known attacks for intrusion 
detection. NIDS has stronger detection mechanism to detect network intruders by 
comparing current behavior with already observed behavior in real time. NIDS mostly 
monitors IP and transport layer headers of individual packet and detects intrusion activity. 
NIDS uses signature based and anomaly based intrusion detection techniques. NIDS has 
very limited visibility inside the host machines. If the network traffic is encrypted there is 
no effective way for the NIDS to decrypt the traffic for analysis [99]. 
 
A NID [100] is not an access control mechanism (like a firewall). Nor is a firewall an ID 
device although firewalls can provide helpful insight on authorized access attempts. Just 
like an alarm system on a car, network based intrusion detection is also not going to stop 




the functionality of IDS capabilities to interrupt communication sessions or modify access 
control lists to dynamically ‘defend’ against an attack. Interestingly enough, this 
capability actually creates a potential denial of service opportunity for a would-be hacker. 
 
2.6.2.2. Host based ıntrusion detection systems 
 
“HIDS refers to the class of IDS that reside on and monitor an individual host machine” 
[98]. HIDS monitors and analyzes the information collected from a specific host machine 
[99]. HIDS detects intrusion for the machine by collecting information such as file system 
used, network events, system calls, etc. HIDS observes modification in host kernel, host 
file system and behavior of the program. Upon detection of deviation from expected 
behavior, it reports the existence of attack. The efficiency of HIDS depends on chosen 
system characteristics to monitor.  
 
HIDS detects intrusion for the machine by collecting information such as file system used, 
network events, system calls, etc. HIDS observes modification in host kernel, host file 
system and behavior of the program. Upon detection of deviation from expected behavior, 
it reports the existence of attack. The efficiency of HIDS depends on chosen system 
characteristics to monitor. Each HIDS detects intrusion for the machines in which it is 
placed [87]. These IDSs can look into system and application log files to detect any 
intruder activity. Some of these systems are reactive, meaning that they inform you only 
when something has happened. Some HIDS are proactive; they can sniff the network 











2.7. Firewall systems 
 
2.7.1. What is a firewall? 
 
“A firewall is a networking system that helps in preventing unauthorized access of one’s 
computer over the internet (ie, It acts as a protection barrier between the system and the 
network)” [101]. While [102] elaborate that a firewall can be a hardware or software for 
defending the privacy, reliability, and accessibility of income and outcome packet over 
the network. In addition, [68] also states that different types of firewalls can be found on 
routers or even on dedicated network servers.  
 
The firewall (sometimes referred to as a bastion host) is also a subsystem of computer 
software and hardware that intercepts data packets before allowing them into or out of a 
Local Area Network (LAN) [103]. A firewall makes decisions on whether or not data is 
allowed to pass based upon a security policy. For each packet of data, the firewall 
compares known components of the packet to a security rule set and decides if the packet 
should be allowed to pass. An efficient firewall is meant to intercept the data between the 
Internet and your computer. All data traffic must pass through it, and the firewall allows 
only authorized data to pass into the corporate network.  
 
2.7.2. Firewalls in network security 
 
The purpose of a firewall is to block traffic from the outside, but it could also be used to 
block traffic from the inside [54]. A firewall is also responsible for controlling access 
among devices, such as computers, networks, and servers [104]. Therefore the most 
common deployment is between a secure and an insecure network (for example, between 
the computers you control and the Internet), as shown in figure 2.17. A firewall may be 
placed to authorize all confident traffic and to deny all other requests, and in addition it 
may also be set to deny all messages of a particular kind except of specified network 




In addition, firewalls are intended to be a safeguard adjacent to effective endeavors of an 
assortment of security breaches [102]. Firewalls are a key part of the Internet infrastructure 
to protect users and network services against attackers. Basically, a firewall separates 
several network segments and it enforces a filtering policy. This filtering policy 
determines what packets are allowed to enter and to leave a given network segment. The 
filtering policy is expressed in an ACL that uses a vendor-specific low-level language.  
 
The ACL contains a list of rules where each rule contains one or several packet selectors, 
for example the source and destination address, port source and destination, protocol type, 
and other fields available in the packet headers; and one action, for example accept, deny, 
log among many others [105]. 
 
Figure 2.17 shows a network consisting of an internal network (which is to be secured) 
and an external network (not  trusted). The firewall controls access between these two 
networks, allowing and denying packets according to a security policy  [104]. 
 
 
Figure 2.17. An example of a  network consisting of an internal and an external network [104]. 
 
The common idea behind any firewall is to allow legitimate entities to access shared 
networked resources based on predefined policies. But the problem is that most firewalls 
do not know how to handle traffic unless it is predefined within the policy. In other words 
they lack the ability to learn from past experience and thus rely on human intervention. In 




rules to open certain ports as needed by the network users and applications. Hardening 
firewalls is effective in blocking illegal access to the network but cannot stop other sorts 
of network attacks by external and internal entities to the open ports. This is because they 
are considered legitimate activities by the firewall. In some cases even the most hardened 
firewalls can fall into an attacker’s trap by responding to the attack packets rather than 
dropping them and continuing to process normal network activities [68].  
 
Firewalls use security policies to inspect incoming and outgoing network traffic. A 
security policy consists of a set of filtering rules. Each filtering rule is defined by a set of 
filtering fields, and associated with an action to either block or forward a packet to its 
destination [106]. The last rule in a security policy is the default filtering rule which is 
usually assumed to be “Deny” [29, 106]. When a packet arrives at a firewall, a security 
policy is applied to determine the appropriate action. Actions include accepting the packet, 
which means the packet is allowed to travel to the intended destination. A packet can be 
denied, which means the packet is not permitted to travel to the intended destination (it is 
dropped or possibly is bounced back). The firewall may also log information about the 
packet, which is important to maintain certain services [104].  
 
Firewall packet filtering [106] is performed in a sequential order starting from the first 
rule until a matching rule is found. If no matching rule is found, the packet is processed 
by the default rule. Thus, the computational complexity of the filtering process depends 
significantly on the length of each filtering rule as well as the depth of finding a matching 
filtering rule in the security policy. Hence, the order of the filtering rules, the order of the 
rule-fields, and the characteristics of the network traffic flow have all significant impact 
on the cumulative packet filtering time. And upon receiving a network packet, the firewall 
analyzes its characteristics (source address, destination address, port number, network 
status, actual data delivered, etc.) and determines whether to let it go through, drop it, 






Before building a firewall in preparation for connecting your network to the rest of the 
internet, it is important to understand exactly what network resources and services you 
want to protect. The Network Policy is a document that describes an organization’s 
network security concerns [50]. Furthermore [107] emphasized that when deploying 
firewalls in an organization, it is essential to verify that they are configured properly. 
Because firewall [108] is the foundation of enterprise network security, critical 
management task of firewall is required. Firewall configuration includes a set of large 
access control rules, each rules specify the source address, destination address, source 
port, destination port, one or more of the protocol ID and a proper function. This feature 
is a typical "accept" or "rejected".  
 
Also [29] question was; How should a firewall be implemented? In theory, a firewall 
simply blocks all unauthorized communication between computers in the organization and 
computers outside the organization. In practice, the details depend on the network 
technology, the capacity of the connection, the traffic load, and the organization's policies. 
Thus, no single solution works for all organizations; building an effective, customized 
firewall can be difficult.  To operate at network speeds, a firewall must have hardware and 
software optimized for the task. Fortunately, most commercial routers include a high-
speed filtering mechanism that can be used to perform much of the necessary work.  
 
A manager can configure the filter in a router to request that the router block specified 
datagrams.  Alternatively, firewall implementation works well for an organization that has 
a single serial connection to the rest of the global Internet. Some sites have a different 
interconnection topology. For example, suppose a company has three or four large 
customers who each need to deposit or extract large volumes of information. The company 
wishes to have a single firewall, but allow connections to multiple sites [29].  
 
Figure 2.18 below illustrates one possible firewall architecture that accommodates 





Figure 2.18. An alternative firewall architecture that permits multiple external [29]. 
 
2.7.3. Types of firewalls 
 
Firewalls are classified into three main categories: [107, 109, 110]: packet filtering, circuit 
gateways, and application gateways. Commonly, more than one of these is used at the 
same time. 
 
2.7.3.1. Packet filtering gateways 
 
“A packet filtering gateway is defined as a firewall technique used to control network 
access by monitoring outgoing and incoming packet and allowing them to pass or half 
based on the source and destination internet protocol (IP) addresses, protocols and port” 
[111].  
 
A packet filter [104] is the most basic type of a firewall since it only filters at the network 
and transport layers (layers two and three). Therefore a packet filter’s operations are 
similar to a network routers. The packet filter receives a packet, determines the appropriate 
action based on the policy, then performs the action on the packet. Packet filters only 
considers the IP addresses (layer two information), the port numbers (layer one 
information), and the transport protocol type (layer three information). Furthermore, since 






Packet filtering firewall only allows packets which are allowed as per your firewall policy. 
Each packet passing through is inspected and then the firewall decides to pass it or not 
[111]. Packet filtering gateways use the source or destination host to determine if the 
packet is allowed to pass the gateway [112]. And if the packet is allowed to or from the 
network it will be forwarded to the next hub as per the routing table information for this 
packet’s destination. On the other hand, if the packet is blocked it will be discarded. 
 
The advantages of packet filters; they are fast, flexible, transparent (no changes are 
required at the client) and cheap. Most routers will provide packet filtering capabilities, 
and pure packet filter firewalls do not require powerful hardware [103]. This sort of 
“firewall” is normally quite cheap to implement, as today most routers have filtering 
capabilities. However, logging and alarming is normally not supported by routers and 
FTP, X11 and DNS services are not easy to implement properly. Another problem that 
could exist with using a packet filter as our firewall is the handling of IP fragments are 
handled. Normally, fragments are passed through the gateway as they are no threat to the 
inside system (either they can be reassembled and therefore the address/port of the first 
fragment was valid or they are dropped by the destination host) but if information leakage 
is a concern of yours, a packet filter may not be the best solution [68]. 
 
Furthermore, there are two types of packet filtering; Stateless packet filtering and Stateful 
packet filtering [113].  
 
2.7.3.1.1. Stateless packet filtering 
 
If the information about the passing packets is not remembered by the firewall, then this 
type of filtering is called stateless packet filtering [113]. In the stateless case, the filtering 
actions, such as accepting or rejecting packet flows, are taken according to a set of static 
configuration rules. These rules only pay attention to information contained in the packet 





Indeed stateless packet filtering firewalls can block those packets that are not meeting the 
valid state machine of a given connection oriented protocol. As with stateless packet 
filtering, stateful filtering intercepts the packets at the network layer and verifies if they 
match previously defined security rules. Moreover, stateful firewalls keep track of each 
connection in an internal state table. Although the entries in this table varies according to 
the manufacturer of every product, they typically include source and destination IP 
addresses, port numbers and information about the connection status [113]. 
 
The main advantage of stateless firewalls is their filtering operations speed. However, 
since they do not keep track of state connection data, they fail at handling some 
vulnerabilities that benefit from the position of a packet within existing streams of traffic. 
Fortunately, Stateful firewalls solve this problem and improve packet filtering by keeping 
track of connection status [114]. In addition, these types of firewalls are not smart enough 
and can be fooled very easily by the hackers.  And these are especially dangerous for UDP 
type of data packets. The reason is that, the allow/deny decisions are taken on packet by 
packet basis and these are not related to the previous allowed/denied packets [113]. 
 
2.7.3.1.2. Stateful Packet Filtering 
 
These can be termed as smart firewalls. This type of filtering is also known as Dynamic 
packet filtering. Stateful packet filtering supports both connection and connectionless 
protocols (TCP, UDP, ICMP, and so on). Dynamic packet filtering monitors each 
connection and creates a temporary (time-limited) inbound filter exception for the 
connection. This allows blocking incoming traffic originating from a particular port 
number and address while still allowing return traffic from that same port number and 
address [113]. Stateful firewalls perform the same operations as packet filters but also 





Figure 2.19. Stateful Packet Filtering [113]. 
 
Though stateful firewalls are problematic from the fault-tolerance perspective since they 
introduce a single point of failure in the network schema [105]. But they extend packet 
filtering capabilities by performing conformance checking upon the network traffic. 
Basically, stateful firewalls enforce that the communications between two peers evolve 
according to the protocol specification. In practice, stateful firewalls implement a finite 
state automaton for each supported protocol that determines what state-transitions are 
valid from the current state. Then, for each network packet, stateful firewalls check if it 
triggers a valid state-transition. This stateful capability allows the firewall administrator 
to modify the ACL to perform some action on the packets. 
 
2.7.3.2. Circuilt proxies 
 
In the circuit-level firewall, all connections are monitored and only those connections that 
are found to be valid are allowed to pass through the firewall. This generally means that a 
client behind the firewall can initiate any type of session, but clients outside the firewall 
cannot see or connect to a machine protected by the firewall. Stateful inspections usually 
occur at the Network Layer, thus making it fast and preventing suspect packets from 






The main difference between the circuit proxy and the packet filtering firewall is that the 
former is the addressee to which all communicators must address their packets. Assuming 
access has been granted, the circuit proxy replaces the original address (its own) with the 
address of the intended destination. It has the disadvantage of laying claim to the 
processing resources required to make changes to the header, and the advantage of 
concealing the IP address of the target system [109]. 
 
2.7.3.3. Application level proxies 
 
An application gateway [113] goes one step beyond a packet filter. Instead of simply 
checking the IP parameters, it actually looks at the application layer data. Single 
application gateways are often called proxies, such as an SMTP proxy that understand the 
SMTP protocol. These check the data that is being sent and authenticate that the particular 
protocol is being used perfectly. Let’s say we were create an SMTP application gateway.  
 
Further, [68] stated that application level firewalls allows network services (e.g. Telnet, 
FTP, etc.) to be established and used within predefined criteria controlled by firewall 
policies. However, even market leading firewalls such as Check Point Firewall-1 still lack 
a self-learning mechanism, in other words they cannot learn from past attacks 
dynamically. Firewalls are designed by humans and need human intervention in order to 
be kept up-to-date with latest security patches and rules configuration. The advantage with 
application gateways is that they are secure, but inefficient, either non-transparent to users 
and applications or are hard to be set up and manage. Only a limited set of applications is 
supported and special tailoring is needed for each one.  
 
2.8. Firewall Technologies 
 
Firewalls have additional capabilities one of them is Network Address Translation (NAT), 





2.8.1. Virtual private networking 
 
“VPN is a connection that allows private data to be sent securely over a shared or public 
network such as the Internet” [115]. A VPN is constructed on top of existing network 
media and protocols by using additional protocols and usually encryption. VPNs are most 
often used to provide secure network communications across untrusted networks. For 
example, VPN technology is widely used to extend the protected network of a multi-site 
organization across the Internet, and sometimes to provide secure remote user access to 
internal organizational networks via the Internet. Two common choices for secure VPNs 
are IPsec6 and SSL/TLS 
 
The two most common VPN architectures are gateway-to-gateway and host-to-gateway; 
Gateway-to-gateway architectures connect multiple fixed sites over public lines through 
the use of VPN gateways for example, to connect branch offices to an organization’s 
headquarters. A VPN gateway is usually part of another network device such as a firewall 
or router. When a VPN connection is established between the two gateways, users at 
branch locations are unaware of the connection and do not require any special settings on 
their computers [116].  
 
Host-to-gateway, provides a secure connection to the network for individual users, usually 
called remote users, who are located outside of the organization (at home, in a hotel, etc.) 
Here, a client on the user machine negotiates the secure connection with the organization’s 
VPN gateway. For gateway-to-gateway and host-to-gateway VPNs, the VPN functionality 
is often part of the firewall itself. Placing it behind the firewall would require VPN traffic 
to be passed through the firewall while encrypted, preventing the firewall from inspecting 
the traffic. All remote access (host-to-gateway) VPNs allow the firewall administrator to 
decide which users have access to which network resources. This access control is 
normally available on a per-user and per-group basis; that is, the VPN policy can specify 
which users and groups are authorized to access which resources, should an organization 




2.8.2. Network access control 
 
NAT is the process of translating internal IP addresses to IP addresses that are visible to 
the external network. NAT is very often used with a special group of IP addresses (virtual 
IP, non-Internet-routable IP address), although it works with any IP address scheme. What 
NAT does is basically a one-to-one or a many-to-one IP address translation. An inside 
(local) IP address is mapped to an outside (global) IP address, meaning that an inside IP 
address is replaced by the appropriate outside IP address, and vice versa [115]. Network 
Address Translation includes the following steps:  
 
 The IP address in the IP header is replaced with the new inside or outside IP address. 
 The port numbers in the TCP/UDP header is replaced with the new port if port 
translation is enabled. 
 The checksum for the IP packet is recalculated and checked for integrity. 
 
The TCP header checksum must also be recalculated since this checksum is calculated 
using the new inside or outside IP address, new port (if applicable) and the payload (if 
applicable). Another common requirement for firewalls at the edge of a network is to 
perform client checks for incoming connections from remote users and allow or disallow 
access based on those checks. This checking, commonly called network access control 
(NAC) or network access protection (NAP), allows access based on the user’s credentials 
and the results of performing “health checks” on the user’s computer. Health checks 
typically consist of verifying that one or more of the following comply with organizational 
policy: 
 
2.8.3. Proxy systems  
 
Proxying provides Internet access to a single host, or a very small number of hosts, while 
appearing to provide access to all of your hosts. The hosts that have access act as proxies 




evaluates requests from the client and decides which to pass on and which to disregard. If 
a request is approved, the proxy server talks to the real server on behalf of the client, and 
proceeds to relay requests from the client to the real server, and to relay the real server's 
answers back to the client. There are a number of advantages to using proxy services  
[115]: 
 
2.8.4. Are the existing traditional network security mechanisms sufficient? 
 
Nowadays some companies which recognize the importance of security adopt security 
systems such as firewalls, IDSs, and virus monitors. In this way, they integrate different 
security tools so as to secure their networks. [117] state that security mechanisms are used 
in different ways; virus monitors examine network traffic aiming to prevent malicious 
code from entering the network by detecting known malicious code patterns.  
 
Virus monitors can only detect known viruses so new viruses can only be detectable after 
their pattern characteristics are being analyzed and are made available.  IDSs are used to 
only detect and attacks. Furthermore, firewalls are used to guard and isolate connected 
segments of inter-networks. “Inside” network domains are protected against “outside” un-
trusted networks, or parts of a network are protected against other parts.  
 
Though it is not easy to use all security systems owing to high cost but it is not enough to 
protect a company’s system with only a single security system, because each security 
system has different features in present days, in which particularly DoS and virus attacks 
are becoming rampant. However, traditional security mechanisms have failed to fully 
deliver in as far as guarding networks against attacks is concerned since they have got a 
lot of challenges as stated below; 
 
Virus monitoring approach is not effective since it can detect only known viruses. New 




made available. And also for virus monitors and IDSs for them to be effective they need 
constant updating of new virus information [117]. 
 
[12] Argue that currently IDSs and firewalls have degenerated in terms of ability to resist 
attacks against them. [13] elaborate that traditional security mechanisms are also error 
prone. [14] state that traditional security mechanisms rely on topology restrictions and 
controlled network entry points to enforce traffic filtering. 
 
Furthermore, [15] state that  the current IDSs technology further proves sufficient for 
defending against casual attackers using well known techniques, but there is still a need 
to design tools to defend against sophisticated and well organized adversaries. In addition, 
traditional network security tools are not very sophisticated and rely on ad-hoc schemes 
and experimental work.  
 
The current IDS technology may prove sufficient for defending against casual attackers 
using well known techniques, but there is still a need to design tools to defend against 
sophisticated and well organized adversaries. [9] emphasizes that IDSs have got a lot of 
false alarms also firewalls cannot differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate packets 
and there a lot of security vulnerabilities discovered every year with just about firewall on 
the market. With all much importance attached to network security, the study established 
that there was a need for a more systematic approach for securing networks. 
 
As an effective defensive mechanism against network attacks and also to add intelligence 
to the traditional firewall, an intelligent firewall agent can protect a network against both 
DDOS and ARP spoofing attacks using a firewall to filter both incoming and outgoing 
packets making use of allow and deny rules approach. The intelligent firewall agent 
consists of a four way defense approach of detection, prevention, end of attack and cancel 
attacks. An expert system was also integrated in the detection stage. This could analyze 
the results gained after applying a preventative mechanism to learn the prevention time of 




Conclusively, with an intelligent firewall agent system provides effectiveness and 
efficiency than other measures which were earlier implemented but do not seem to 
embrace all the four approaches of network defense mechanism at once and keeping all 
this in mind, the study chose to implement a rules based intelligent firewall agent as the 














CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY 
 
 
In this section, an explanation of the proposed architecture is presented. The study 
proposed an intelligent firewall agent. The proposed system consisted of four components; 
First component was detection of attacks, Secondly applying prevention, thirdly end of 
attack and lastly cancel prevention as illustrated below.  
 
3.1. Intelligent Firewall Agent Architecture 
 
The architecture (figure 3.1 below) contained a firewall system as the preventative 
mechanism and an intrusion detection system for detecting attacks on a network. The IDS 
could monitor the network and incase of any attack it could trigger an alert to inform the 
system administrator that there is an attack on the network. 
 
 




For detection, an IDS was applied to detect attacks on the network. The IDS was placed 
at the entry of the network (before) the firewall so that to monitor traffic flows from 
internal network to the external network or from external network to internal network. The 
IDS were used in a way that whenever any attack was launched on the network, the 
detection engine could send an alert to the network administrator. And this was inform of 
an alarm or alert message in order to inform that there is an intrusion or an attack. And the 
alert could provide all the relevant information concerning the attack type, time attack 
happened, IP address of the attacker. 
 
On addition network sniffers were used to analyze and monitor packets on the network so 
that to find out any kind of anomalies in the transmitted data packets. With sniffing, 
researchers managed to legitimately capture data being transmitted. The sniff data output 
was analyzed in case of any anomalies in the captured packets, the attacker information 
could be analyzed later using rule sets.  
 
With the help on an expert system, the time at which an attack occurred could be recorded 
to calculate the mean of packet sending for attacks. This increased performance in a way 
that I could record the rate of packets that can be sent during the process of detection and 
it also recorded the number of packets that can be sent in a given time. The time difference 
at which the packets were received and left the network was considered to find out 
suspicious packets. During Sniffing, the captured sniff output was fully analyzed so that 
the intelligent agent could find any anomaly in the packet headers in that obviously that 
could show that there is intrusion or any kind of attack on the network. 
 
Once packets have been handled by all enabled preprocessors, they are handed off to the 
detection engine. The detection engine is the meat of the signature-based IDS in Snort. 
The detection engine takes the data that comes from the preprocessor and its plug-ins, and 
that data is checked through a set of rules [118]. If the rules match the data in the packet, 
they are sent to the alert processor. The signature based IDS function is accomplished by 




packet may be used to log the activity or generate an alert. And incase an attack was found 
in the packets, an alert was triggered. 
 
Since IDS were entirely used to detect any intrusion or attacks on the network, if at all 
there was an attack detected, according to the intelligent firewall system the next step we 
had to defend the network against the detected attacks. A preventative mechanism was 
applied so that to prevent attacks on the network. The study applied firewall system as the 
preventive mechanism to defend against attacks (DoS and ARP Spoofing).  
 
Using firewall system, defined firewall rules were set. And these rule sets were formulated 
basing on Source IP address, Destination IP, Source Port, Destination Port, Packet size 
and Protocol. Here the aspect of intelligence in this system is reflected by the use of 
decision making system which can decide whether to block or allow traffic depending on 
the rules set. 
 
In figure 3.2. Illustrates the detection and prevention system applied during this study. 
 
 






















And this worked in a way that it could read the packets sent via the network to check 
whether in the transmitted packets there are suspicious ones. And if data packets were 
found suspicious, as explained before, that evidenced a malicious activity (attack). This 
called for a defense against the found attacks in the network. Thus a firewall rule based 
system is used. With this mechanism, incoming and outgoing packets could be fully 
analyzed using set rules. And only packets which match with the defined rule sets were 
allowed to go through the network while those packets which do not match rules are 
dropped. Hence by using this mechanism it successfully defended the network against 
attacks meaning it’s an intelligent firewall agent is an appropriate defensive mechanism 
against attacks. 
 
Does the attack end? Yes, after applying the preventative mechanism (firewall rule sets) 
it could only allow genuine packets which matched the defined rule sets meaning with this 
the attack could end. And prior to the end of attack, the preventative mechanism is 
cancelled and finally the system ends and vice versa. 
 




Snort is an open source network intrusion prevention and detection system (IDS/IPS) that 
combines the benefits of signature, protocol, and anomaly base inspection. Snort uses a 
set of rules to check for hostile packets in the network and then generate alerts to the 
network administrator [94]. Snort is a lightweight intrusion detection system which can 
easily be deployed on almost any node of a network with minimal disruption to operations. 
Lightweight IDSs are small, powerful, and flexible enough to be used as permanent 






On addition, snort is a well-known and accepted IDS within network security communities 
and it was created by Martin Roesc in 1998 [94]. And this has left snort as the most popular 
NIDS and it is Open Source, which means that the original program source code is 
available to anyone at no charge and this has allowed many people to contribute to and 
analyze the programs construction. SNORT uses the most common open-source license 
known as the GNU General Public License [120]. The main aim of using snort and other 
IDSs is to effectively analyze all packets passing through the network without any packet 
drop [94]. 
 
3.2.1.1. Components of snort 
 
Snort is logically divided into multiple components which work together to detect 
particular attacks and generate output in a required format from the detection system 
[95]; 
 
a. Packet Decoder 
b. Preprocessors 
c. Detection Engine 
d. Logging and Alerting System 
e. Output Modules 
 
Figure 3.3 below shows the arrangement of snort components. Any data packet 
coming from the network enters the packet decoder. And on its way towards the output 






Figure 3.3.Components of Snort [121]. 
Packet decoder: 
 
The packet decoder takes packets from different types of network interfaces and 
prepares the packets to be preprocessed or to be sent to the detection engine. The 




A preprocessor takes the raw packets and checks them against certain plug-ins (like 
an RPC plug-in, an HTTP plug-in, and a port scanner plug-in).These plug-ins check 
for a certain type of behavior from the packet. Once the packet is determined to have 
a particular type of “behavior,” it is then sent to the detection engine. Snort supports 
many kinds of preprocessors and their attendant plug-ins, covering many commonly 
used protocols as well as larger-view protocol issues such as IP fragmentation 
handling, port scanning and flow control, and deep inspection of richly featured 
protocols [118]. 
 
The detection engine: 
 
The detection engine is the most important part of Snort. Its responsibility is to detect 




for this purpose. The rules are read into internal data structures or chains where they 
are matched against all packets.  
 
If a packet matches any rule, appropriate action is taken; otherwise the packet is 
dropped. Appropriate actions may be logging the packet or generating alerts [95]. 
Depending upon how powerful your machine is and how many rules you have defined, 
it may take different amounts of time to respond to different packets. If traffic on your 
network is too high when Snort is working in NIDS mode, you may drop some packets 
and may not get a true real-time response.  
 
The logging and alerting system: 
 
After the Snort data goes through the detection engine, it needs to go out somewhere. 
If the data matches a rule in the detection engine, an alert is triggered. Depending upon 
what the detection engine finds inside a packet, the packet may be used to log the 
activity or generate an alert. Logs are kept in simple text files, tcpdump- style files or 
some other form. Alerts can be sent to a log file, through a network connection, 
through UNIX sockets or Windows Popup (SMB), or SNMP traps. The alerts can also 
be stored in an SQL database such as MySQL and Postgres [118]. 
 
Alerts are any sort of user notification of an intruder activity. When an IDS detects an 
intruder, it has to inform security administrator about this using alerts. Alerts may be 
in the form of pop-up windows, logging to a console, sending e-mail and so on. Alerts 
are also stored in log files or databases where they can be viewed later on by security 
experts. And snort can generate alerts in many forms and are controlled by output 
plug-ins. Snort can also send the same alert to multiple destinations. For example, it 
is possible to log alerts into a database and generate SNMP traps simultaneously. Some 
plug-ins can also modify firewall configuration so that offending hosts are blocked at 







Basically these modules control the type of output generated by the logging and 
alerting system. Depending on the configuration, output modules can send output 
messages to a number of other destinations. Commonly used output modules are: 
 
 The database module is used to store Snort (Snort 2004) output data in 
databases, such as MySQL, MSSQL or Oracle, 
 The SNMP module can be used to send Snort (Snort 2004) alerts in the form 
of traps to a management server, 
 The Sending Server Message Block (SMB) alerts module can send alerts to 
Microsoft Windows machines in the form of pop-up SMB alert windows, 
 The syslog module logs messages to the syslog utility (using this module you 
can log messages to a centralized logging server.) 
 XML or CSV modules can be used to save data in XML or comma separated 
files. The CSV files can then be imported into databases or spreadsheet 
software for further processing or analysis. 
 
3.2.1.2. Snort modes 
 
Snort operates in two basic modes: packet sniffer mode and NIDS mode. It can be used as 
a packet sniffer, like tcp dump or snoop [95]. When sniffing packets, Snort can also log 
these packets to a log file. The file can be viewed later on using Snort or tcp dump. No 
intrusion detection activity is done by Snort in this mode of operation. Using Snort for this 
purpose is not very useful as there are many other tools available for packet logging. 
 
When Snort is used in NIDS mode, it uses its rules to find out if there is any network 
intrusion detection activity. The rules contain the information that defines the who, where, 
and what of a packet, as well as what to do in the event that a packet with all the attributes 




action tells Snort what to do when it finds a packet that matches the rule criteria. There 
are five available default actions in Snort: alert, log, pass, activate, and dynamic [115]. 
 
 Alert; generate an alert using the selected alert method, and then log the packet, 
 Log; log the packet, 
 Pass; ignore the packet, 
 activate; alert and then turn on another dynamic rule, 
 Dynamic; remain idle until activated by an activate rule, then act as a log rule. 
 
Network intrusion detection mode: 
 
In network intrusion detection mode, Snort does not log each captured packet as it does in 
the network sniffer mode. Instead, it applies rules on all captured packets. If a packet 
matches a rule, only then is it logged or an alert is generated. If a packet does not match 
any rule, the packet is dropped silently and no log entry is created. When you use Snort in 
intrusion detection mode, typically you provide a configuration file on the command line. 
This configuration file contains Snort rules or reference to other files that contain Snort 
rules. In addition to rules, the configuration file also contains information about input and 
output plug-ins. The typical name of the Snort configuration file is snort.conf. The 
following command starts Snort in the Network Intrusion Detection (NID) mode [115]. 
snort -c /opt/snort/etc/snort.conf 
 
When this command is started snort will read the configuration file snort.conf and all other 
files included in this file. Typically these files contain Snort rules and configuration data. 
After reading these files, Snort will build its internal data structures and rule chains. All 
captured packets will then be matched against these rules and appropriate action will be 







Network Sniffer Mode: 
 
In the network sniffer mode, Snort acts like the commonly used program tcpdump. It can 
capture and display packets from the network with different levels of detail on the console. 
You don’t need a configuration file to run Snort in the packet sniffing mode. The following 
command displays information about each packet flowing on the network segment [115]: 
/snort –v 
 
Snort will continue to display captured packets on the screen until you break using 
Ctrl-C. At the time Snort terminates, it will display statistical information. The 
following is a typical output for a TCP packet [122]: If you analyze the output in figure 
4.1  the following information about the packet can be viewed: 
 
  Date and time the packet was captured 13th of April at 5:58:16. 
 Source IP address is 192.168.58131.  
 Source port number is 22.   
 Destination IP address is 192.168.58.242.  
 Transport layer protocol used in this packet is UDP. 
 Time To Live or TTL value in the IP header part is 64.  
 Type of Service or TOS value is 0x0.  
 Packet ID is 38864.  
 Length of IP header is 20.  
 IP payload is 207 bytes long.  








3.2.2. Iptable firewall 
 
Iptables is part of the Netfilter project. Netfilter is a set of Linux kernel hooks that 
communicate with the network stack. Iptables is a command and the table structure that 
contains the rule sets that control the packet filtering [70]. Iptables are complex, it filters 
packets by the fields in IP, UDP, and ICMP packet headers and a number of different 
actions can be taken on each packet. 
 
The iptables architecture groups network packet processing rules into tables by function 
(packet filtering, NAT, and other packet mangling), each of which have chains 
(sequences) of processing rules. Rules consist of matches (used to determine which 
packets the rule will apply to) and targets (that determine what will be done with the 
matching packets). Iptables operates at OSI Layer 3 (Network). For OSI Layer 2 (Link), 
there are other technologies such as ebtables (Ethernet Bridge Tables) [123]. Presently, 
this firewall has become more and more popular (both among end users and network 
administrators). The popularity of this firewall is closely related to Linux operating 
system, because iptables works with Linux kernels 2.4 and 2.6 and almost every major 
Linux distribution comes with pre-installed iptables firewall [124]. 
 
The core of this firewall consists of four parts; tables, chains, matches and targets [124]. 
A system administrator is able to define an iptables policy, i.e. tables of chains, which 
describe how a kernel should react against different groups of packets. On the other 
hand,[70] states that there three tables in iptables, any rules or custom chains that are 
created will always go into one of these tables. The filter table is the default, and is the 
one most used. The filter table contains five predefined chains: INPUT, OUTPUT, 







PREROUTING is used for altering packets just as they enter the firewall and before they 
hit the routing decision. POSTROUTING is used to mangle packets just after all routing 
decisions have been made. OUTPUT is used for altering locally generated packets before 
they enter the routing decision. INPUT is used to alter packets after they have been routed 
to the local computer itself, but before the user space application actually sees the data. 
FORWARD is used to mangle packets after they have hit the first routing decision, but 
before they actually hit the last routing decision. Note that mangle cannot be used for any 
kind of Network Address Translation or Masquerading; the nat table was made for these 
kinds of operations [115]. 
 
The filter table should be used exclusively for filtering packets. For example, we could 
DROP, LOG, ACCEPT or REJECT packets without problems, as we can in the other 
tables. There are three chains built in to this table. The first one is named FORWARD and 
is used on all non-locally generated packets that are not destined for local host (the 
firewall). INPUT is used on all packets that are destined for our local host (the firewall) 
and OUTPUT is finally used for all locally generated packets. When a packet first enters 
the firewall, it hits the hardware and then get has passed on to the proper device driver in 
the kernel.  
 
Then the packet starts to go through a series of steps in the kernel before it is either sent 
to the correct application (locally), or forwarded to another host or whatever happens to 
it. The packet goes through the different steps Figure 2.12.1 explains how packets traverse 
the different chains and in which order [115]. When a packet first enters the firewall, it 
hits the hardware and then get has passed on to the proper device driver in the kernel. Then 
the packet starts to go through a series of steps in the kernel before it is either sent to the 
correct application (locally), or forwarded to another host or whatever happens to it. The 
packet goes through the different steps (figure 3.4 below) explains how packets traverse 






Figure 3.4. Shows how the packets traverse the built in chains now (Asarcıklı 2005). 
 
3.2.2.1. How to write rules 
 
Iptables are used to create a chain collection of rules that are applied to every packet  [124]. 
Each rule is a line that the kernel looks at to find out what to do with a packet. If all the 
criteria or matches are met, the target instruction is performed [115]. And normally the 
rules are written using the syntax below; 
 
 Iptables (-t table) command (match) (target/jump) 
 
The -t option specifies which table to use. Per default, the filter table is used. We may 
specify one of the following tables with the -t option. The nat table is used mainly for 




to rules. Packets in a stream only traverse this table once. It is assumed that the first packet 
of a stream is allowed. The rest of the packets in the same stream are automatically 
"NAT"ed or Masqueraded etc, and will be subject to the same actions as the first packet. 
These will not go through this table again, but will nevertheless be treated like the first 
packet in the stream. This is the main reason why you should not do any filtering in this 
table. The mangle table is used mainly for mangling packets. Among other things, we can 
change the contents of different packets and that of their headers. Examples of this would 
be to change the TTL, TOS or MARK. The MARK is not really a change to the packet, 
but a mark value for the packet is set in kernel space. 
 
The command should always come first, or alternatively directly after the table 
specification. The “command” is used to tell the program what to do, for example to insert 
a rule or to add a rule to the end of the chain, or to delete a rule. The “match” is the part 
of the rule that is sent to the kernel that details the specific character of the packet, what 
makes it different from all other packets. Here we can specify what IP address the packet 
comes from, from which network interface, the intended IP address, port, protocol or 
whatever. 
 
Finally, the packet has the target. If all the matches are met for a packet, “target/jump” 
part of the command tells the kernel what to do with it. We could, for example, tell the 
kernel to send the packet to another chain that we have created ourselves, and which is 
part of this particular table. We could tell the kernel to drop the packet dead and do no 
further processing, or we could tell the kernel to send a specified reply to the sender. 
 
A chain is just a simple checklist of rules and specifies what to do with each of the packets. 
The chain rule will either ACCEPT a packet or DROP a packet. If the packet does not 
have any more rules left in the chain, the system will consult the chain policy to decide 
what to do. Most systems are setup with a policy of deny. Therefore, if the packet does 
not match any rules that "allow" it through, then it will "drop" it. Iptables uses a set of 




chain is just a simple checklist of rules and specifies what to do with each of the packets. 
The chain rules will either ACCEPT a packet or DROP a packet. If the packet does not 
have any more rules left in the chain, the system will consult the chain policy to decide 
what to do. Most systems are setup with a policy of deny. Therefore, if the packet does 
not match any rules that "allow" it through, then it will "drop" it [115]  
 
The first decision the kernel has to make upon receipt of a packet is "Where is the 
destination?" If the destination is for the box itself, it will consult the rules for the INPUT 
chain. If the destination is for another network interface (and IP Forwarding is enabled), 
the packet is compared against the FORWARD chain. As long as the packet gets an 
"ACCEPT" by one of the chain rules the packet will be forwarded on. If the Linux box 
itself needs to send network packets, it will consult the OUTPUT chain and if the packet 
is ACCEPTED by one of the rules, it will be sent out to the appropriate interface. One of 
the key concepts is that the INPUT and OUTPUT chains actually refer to the local machine 
rather than to all incoming and outgoing packets [115]. 
 
The three built-in chains are INPUT, OUTPUT and FORWARD and they cannot be 
deleted. The followings are operations to manipulate these chains; [113, 115], 
 
 Create a new chain (-N). 
 Delete an empty chain (-X). 
 Change the policy for a built-in chain. (-P). 
 List the rules in a chain (-L). 
 Flush the rules out of a chain (-F). 
 Zero the packet and byte counters on all rules in a chain (-Z). 
 
There are several ways to manipulate rules inside a chain: 
 
 Append a new rule to a chain (-A). 




 Replace a rule at some position in a chain (-R). 
 Delete a rule at some position in a chain, or the first that matches (-D). 
 
Some other options: 
 
 j Specify the target (--jump) 
 i Specify the input interface (--in-interface) 
 o Specify the output interface (--out-interface) 
 p Specify the protocol (--protocol) 
 s Specify the source (--source) 
 d Specify the destination (--destination) 




ARPwatch is an open source computer software program developed by Lawrence 
Berkeley National Laboratory, a Network Research Group and was released under the 
BSD license. ARPwatch helps to monitor Ethernet traffic activity (like changing IP and 
MAC address) on your network and maintains a database of ethernet/IP address pairings. 
It produces a log of notice pairing of IP and MAC address information along with a 
timestamps, so carefully when a person tries to watch when the pairing activity appeared 
on the network. It also has the option to send reports via email to a network administrator 
when pairing added or changed [125].  
 
ARPwatch is a free UNIX program which listens for ARP replies on a network. It will 
build a table of IP/MAC associations and store them in a file. When the MAC address 
associated with an IP changes (referred to as a flip-flop), an email is sent to an 








CHAPTER 4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
This chapter explains the results obtained during the study which include among others 




Before running the snort rules, it was vital to do sniffing to the network so that to check 
whether there were anomalies in the data packets.  Snort was made to run in the network 
sniffer mode. Here a configuration file to run snort in sniffing mode was not needed. By 
running the command below snort was made to run in sniffing mode. The command 
displays information about each packet flowing on the network segment:  
 
./snort -v  
 
Snort acts like the commonly used program tcpdump. It captured and displayed packets 
from the network with different levels of detail on the console. Consecutively, snort 
displayed and captured packets on the screen showed in figure 4.1.  
 
 





To analyze the output in (figure 24) the following information about the packet was 
captured; 
 
- Date and time the packet was captured 13th of April at 5:58:16.  
- Source IP address is 192.168.58131.  
- Source port number is 22.   
- Destination IP address is 192.168.58.242.  
- Transport layer protocol used in this packet is UDP. 
- Time to Live or TTL value in the IP header part is 64.  
- Type of Service or TOS value is 0x0.  
- Packet ID is 38864.  
- Length of IP header is 20.  
- IP payload is 207 bytes long.  
- Don’t Fragment or DF length is 235. 
 
And to break the sniffing process Ctrl-C was used and at the same time snort was 
terminated, statistical information was displayed. This section provides basic Statistics;  
- Protocol statistics; Traffic for all the protocols decoded by Snort is 
summarized in the breakdown section. 
- Packet I/O Totals; This section shows basic packet acquisition and 
injection peg counts obtained from the DAQ. Includes received, analyzed, 
Dropped, Filtered, injected and Outstanding packets is displayed.  
- Timing statistics; it includes total seconds and packets as well as packet 
processing rates. The rates are based on whole seconds, minutes, etc. and 





Figure 4.2. Statistical information captured after sniffing. 
 
Next was detection of attacks on the network. Our study’s case focused only on denial of 
service attacks (DOS) and ARP spoofing attacks. Thus for this case different modules 
were experimented, modules for DOS attacks and another for ARP spoofing attack. 
 
Denial of service (DOS) module, experiments setups were carried using Linux and Ubuntu 
version 14.0 machine and installed Wireshark for network protocol analyzing. Here 
different DOS attacks were carried for example; a SYN-Flood attack, ICMP Flood attack 
and UDP flood attack modules using hping3 tool. 
 
UDP-Flood attack; the attack was made by running the following hping3 command from 
the attackers machine, and this led to Flooding the victim’s machine. 
For UDP flood attack, the following hping3 command was run. 
 
 







 192.168.58.242 is a targeted IP 
 udp flag set the udp mode. 
 p 80 sets packets to port 80 on victim’s machine (192.168.58.242) 
 data 200 set the interval between packets as 200 packets per second. 
 rand-source is used for random source IP addresses,  
 
So when Wireshark is run, random IP addresses are captured as a source IP addresses and 
destination IP as shown in figure. 
 
 
Figure 4.4. Captured information using wireshark. 
 
Figure 4.3. Below Shows that the victim’s machine (192.168.58.242) was responding with 
ICMP port unreachable since there was no application running on attacker’s machine 
which sent UDP packet. And this indicated that the host does not exist. 
 
In this way, all of the resources of the victim’s machine were consumed and this made 






Figure 4.5.  Shows a flow graph after hping3 script is run and recapture packets using Wireshark  
 




Explanation of the command;  
 flood flag sent the packets as fast as possible 
 S flag set the SYN flag on in TCP mode 
 p 80 sent the packet to port 80 on victim’s machine 192.168.58.242 
 
On a victim machine, capturing and analyzing traffic using Wireshark show that victim 
machine (192.168.58.132) is responding to SYN packet by sending back packets with 
SYN, ACK flags set, but the attacker's machine (192.168.58.242) is not participating three 
way handshake by sending back ACK, instead it is sending RST flag set packet thereby 
resulting in half open connection. And when thousands of such connections are made in a 
few seconds, eventually the victim's machine will get exhausted in no time. Fig. 4.6 shows 





Figure 4.6. Shows a flow graph after hping3 script is run and recapture packets using wireshark.  
 
ICMP flood attack module was also experimented by running the hping3 command below; 
 
. 
Figure 4.7. Icmp hping3 script 
 
Description of the of the script 
 
 P 80 sent packets to port 80 on victim’s machine 
(192.168.58.242) 
 flood flag sent the packet as fast as possible 







In figure 4.8 an attacker sends large number of ICMP Echo Request messages to the 
targeted machine (192.168.58.242) 
 
 
Figure 4.8. Captured information using wireshark 
 
In figure 4.5 below, the attacker machine (192.168.58.242) sent a lot of icmp requests to 
the victim’s machine (192.168.58.131) simultaneously and the victim machine could give 
back reply to the requests made by the attacking machine. This made the target machine 
to typically get flooded with ICMP echo requests thus overloading it with a lot of requests 








For ARP spoofing attack, an experiement was done too using ettercap. The first step was 
to set an IP address on the the machine with ettercap to be in the same subnet. 
Firstly, the network interfaces was configured using the command below; 
#ifconfig interface_name ip_address, netmask mask 
Ifconfig eth0 192.168.58.242 netmask 255.255.255.0 broadcast 
 
To configure the default gateway: 
#route add default gateway ip_address dev interface_name 
#route add default gateway 192.168.1.1 dev eth0 
 
To launch Ettercap so that to start the ARP spoofing, the following command was run on 
the attacker’s machine and it ordered ettercap to be opened in a graphical mode. 
#ettercap -G 
 
From there, ettercap was configured ettercap for unified sniffing. The interface (eth0) was 
selected to sniff on Ubuntu attacker machine. 
 
 





Later the hosts inside the subnet were scanned so that to find the target machines. The 
network range scanned was determined by the IP settings of the interface chosen in the 
previous step. And 4 hosts were found in the host list. Then the target machines were 
selected. The target machines to ARP spoofing were Linux machine (192.168.58.242) and 
the gateway (192.168.58.2). Specified the targets by highlighting the line containing 
192.168.58.2 and clicked on the “target 1” button. Further, we highlighted the line 
containing 192.168.58.242 and clicked on the “target 2” button.  
 
 
Figure 4.11. Shows scanning of the hosts in the subnet and the MAC and IPs of the target machines to be sniffed. 
 
Then started the MITM (ARP poisoning). 
 
 





By running Wireshark on the Linux machine it was getting ARP broadcast messages and 
it could give reply (unicast). Here an ARP request was broadcast to all machines on the 
network asking which machines had those targeted IP address and MAC and the machines 
responded with a unicast replies telling the attacker machines the MAC and IP addresses 
for the requested machines. 
Figure 4.13. An Ettercap ARP Spoofing attack as seen by wireshark. 
 
With the help of Wireshark, the ARP traffic for before and after the attack was compared. 
Before the attack, the gateway and Linux machine to be able to communicate together 
they sent an ARP broadcast to find out the MAC addresses of the other. And after spoofing 




An IDS was used to detect attacks on the network. The Intrusion Detection System was 
placed at the entry of the network (before) the firewall so that it monitor traffic flows from 
internal network to the external network or from external network to internal network and 
for this case, SNORT was used. 
First, snort rules were written in the  
/etc/snort/rules 
 
Using the command below Snort rules were written so that to detect attacks on the network 
as shown in figure.  
 
#action protocol src_IP src_port Direction dst_IP dst_port (msg: “A message”; 




The following were the snort rules written to detect denial of service attacks. 
 
Figure 4.14. Snort rules 
 
Rule1: Alert icmp any any -> any any (msg:"Someone pinging your network"; 
sid:100001) This rule means that for any ICMP ping packets that it sees from any network 
to the HOME_NET, generate an alert with the text or message “someone pinging your 
network”.  
 
Rule 2:  Means that whenever a DOS attack is done from any network to the HOME_NET, 
an alert with the text message of “DDOS flood denial of service attempt”. 
 
After the snort data passes through the detection engine, an whenever data could not match 
a rule in the detection engine, an alert was made. Depending on what the detection could 
find inside the packet, the packet was used to logg the activity or generate an alert. And 
to do this, the following were done;Since it is in the local rules.file where rules that are 
specifically for generating alerts re placed. So first step was to edit the local.rules file so 
that to place the rules there by using the following command; 
 
#sudo vi  /etc/snort/rules/local.rules 
 
Later the rules were input in the local.files folder and were saved using Ctrl C. And since 
changes were made to the files that snort loads, it was important to test the configuration 
file again to check whether the snort configurations are still in order. Using the following 
command; 








 A console; indicates that the warnings are to be displayed on the terminal 
console. 
 q; quiet option, and it does not show the banner and status report 
 u snort; specified to run snort as the following user after startup. 
 g snort; specifies to run snort as the following group after startup. 
 c; indicates the path to snort.conf file. 
 eth0; indicates the network interface to listen to. 
 
To detect the attack, denial of service attacks were launched as explained at earlier at the 
beginining of this chapter. The IDS were used in a way that whenever any attack was 
launched on the network, the detection engine could send an alert to the network 
administrator. And this was inform of an alarm or alert message in order to inform system 
administrators that there is an attack launched on the network.  
 
The alert triggered was on screen alert and it was displayed on the IDS console since this 
specification was given when configuring the IDS. The information provided in the alert 
message varies widely, ranging from a notification that an intrusion has taken place to 
extremely detailed messages outlining the IP addresses of the source and target of the 






Figure 4.15. An alert message after ICMP flood DOS attack. 
 
For ARP Spoofing attack, ARPwatch was used to detect the attack. ARPwatch generate 
alerts when an abnormal use of the ARP protocol is detected. Look at the output that 
ARPwatch generates when changes are detected in ARP/IP assignments. And the 
ARPWatch output shows the changes in MAC and IP addresses. Fig 4.12 below shows a 
change in MAC and IP address in line one immediately when ARP spoofing process starts. 
 
 






For mitigation of attacks, iptables firewall was used. Iptables firewall is rule-based so rules 
were written. Using firewall system, defined firewall rules were set. And these rule sets 
were formulated basing on Source IP address, Destination IP, Source Port, Destination 
Port, Packet size and Protocol. Here the aspect of intelligence in this system is reflected 
by the use of decision making system which can decide whether to block or allow traffic 
depending on the rules set. 
 
After snort analyzing packets sent via the network to check whether in the transmitted 
packets there are suspicious ones, if there is any attack an alert could be triggered. This 
could call for a defensive mechanism against the found attacks in the network.  
 
By applying Iptables firewall, traffic was supervised in a way that whenever packets were 
sent to the network they were first filtered and analyzed whether they matched with the 
specified rule sets in the firewall and if they did they were allowed to go through the 
network and for those which never matched with the set rules were dropped. In this way 
only genuine packets were executed. With this mechanism, incoming and outgoing 
packets could be fully analyzed using set rules. Therefore, to prevent the earlier discussed 
attacks, iptables rules were defined as below; 
 
To defend against SYN-flood attack, iptables script was written as follows; 
 
Table 4.1. Table showing iptable script against SYN-Flood attack. 
 
 
---limit [rate[/unit]: the number of packets to let through per unit of time.  
--limit-burst [count]: sets the count of packets that will be matched in a single “burst. 
# iptables -N syn_flood 
#iptables -AINPUT-ptcp--syn-jsyn_flood 
# iptables -A syn_flood  -m limit  --limit 1/s  --limit-burst 3  -j  RETURN 




With this script, all incoming connections were allowed till the limit was reached. And it 
limited the number of incoming tcp connections or syn-flood attacks. First it will allow 
the normal working of the TCP connection establishment process. All network traffic 
going out of your machine will be allowed out, but all TCP/IP traffic coming into your 
machine will simply be dropped. 
 
 
Figure 4.17.  shows TCP flow graph after iptables script applied to defend against syn-flood attack.  
 
To defend against UDP Flood Attack, iptables script was written as below: 
 




- hitcount; matches only if the hit-count for the packet’s source address in the 
designated recent address list is at least hits. 
 
# iptables -N udp_flood 
# iptables -A INPUT -p udp -j udp_flood 
# iptables -A udp_flood -m state –state NEW –m recent –update –seconds 1 –hitcount 10 –j RETURN 




- NEW; the packet is starting a new connection or is part of a connection that hasn’t 
yet seen packets in both directions. 
 
And this limits any IP address to 10 connections per minute and beyond this they are 




Figure 4.18 Shows flow graph after applied the iptables script against udp flood attack.  
 
To defend against ICMP Flood Attack, iptables script was written: 
 





--limit [rate [/unit]]- the number of packets to let through per unit of time. 
---limit-burst [count] - sets the count of packets that will be matched in a single “burst. 
 
# iptables -N icmp_flood 
# iptables -A INPUT -p icmp -j icmp_flood 
#iptables -A icmp_flood -m limit --limit 1/s --limit-burst 3 -j RETURN 






Inorder to limit the incoming icmp ping requests, the limit module was used to put a limit 
on the incoming connections. This rule could accept ping connections to 1 per second, 
with an initial burst of 3. An if this level crossed it would log the packet with a ping drop.  
 
Then the next rule drops packets if it tries to cross this limit. This rule blocks all ICMP 
incoming packets from out side connection. Here we limit ICMP traffic to one packet per 
second. So even if someone floods the network via smurf, the they can not be allowed. 
Attacker is sending ICMP Echo packets continiously but victims machine is not 
responding by sending ICMP Reply packets as all the packets are being dropped by the 
firewall following Iptable rules. 
 
 
Figure 4.19. Shows flow graph after applied the  iptable script against icmp flood attack. 
 
To prevent spoofing of ip address the following script was used; 
 




#iptables –A INPUT –I –s  -p tcp -m 192.168.58.242 –j LOG –log-prefıx “192.168.58.2_spoof A“ ACCEPT 





This script logs and blocks IP spoofing on the ınterface called eth.1. And with this 




Figure 4.20.  shows TCP flow graph after iptables script applied to defend against arp spofing. 
 
Furthermore, the time from when an attack was detected until firewall rules were applied 
was recorded for the test of the system. At most approximately 164 packets were sent as 
the system is detecting the DOS attack regarding the data given in Table 4.5. Prevention 
time is gained by dividing the maximum time the prevention process requires to the 
average time of single attack. 0.154 seconds of packet traffic (approximately 20 Mb data) 
is controlled by the attacker via ARP poisoning which is the difference between the 
maximum time the prevention process requires and the average time of a single attack. 
With this, it was easy to learn false alerts in the system. 
 
Table 4.5. System Performance as Time Under 99% Confidence Level 








DOS 0.00247 0.38888 0.37196 0.40573 
















The objective of this thesis was to design an intelligent firewall agent as a defensive 
mechanism against network attacks. The intelligent firewall agent addresses two (2) 
important issues; that is to add intelligence to the traditional firewall and also to provide 
an effective defensive mechanism against network attacks. An intelligent firewall 
architecture was proposed to accomplish this objective. And it constituted four (4) 
components that is; the detection component, prevention component, end of attack 
component and lastly the cancel component.  
 
The detection component was applied so as to detect any kind of intrusion in terms of 
attacks on the network. And for this case snort NIDS was used. Snort being rule based, 
rules were written basing on IP address, source IP, Destination IP address, and port 
numbers. This helped in way that whenever an attack would be done on the network, 
packets were checked whether they fit in the set snort rules, if packets matched the given 
set rule specifications they were allowed to go through the network and if no match was 
met packets were denied to go through the network.  If probably an attack was detected 
from the IDS point, a prevention mechanism would be applied. The firewall rule based 
system was used. This was also built on rules. Firewall would monitor incoming and 
outgoing packets in the network. 
 
Using this four way approach of detection, prevention, end of attack and cancel attacks, it 
proved fruitful than the other measures which were earlier implemented but did not seem 




intelligent firewall agent efficiently addressed the prevention of DOS attacks using iptable 
firewall which only allowed genuine packets to go through the network using set rules. In 
addition, intelligence was also successfully added to the existing firewall by using an 
expert system which improved on the accuracy and performance of the system by reducing 
false alerts. 
 
5.2. Limitations  
 
Despite achieving all the stated objectives by the study, there were some limitations 
incurred during the study; during the detection of ARP spoofing, a passive method was 
used to detect ARP spoofing. The main drawback of the passive method was a time lag 
between learning the address mappings and subsequent attack detection. In a situation 
where the ARP spoofing began before the detection tool was started for the first time, the 
tool could learn the forged replies in its IP to MAC address mapping database. And 
whenever the victim started communicating with some other hosts the inconsistency was 
also detected and alert was triggered to show that there is an attack yet in reality it was not 




An automated firewall rule generating system is recommended for generating rules. Since 
there is a lot of increased human intervention during rule generation process and it needs 
to be reduced since this makes the whole process very prone to mistakes and it is also time 
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